Frank’s Case Book

When issues become complicated, sometimes it is necessary to return to common sense notions to sort through conflicting priorities. At present, Congress is debating what to do about high levels of illegal immigration and a large number of illegal immigrants who have already made lives in the United States. The best current estimates indicate that there are approximately 11 million illegal immigrants in the United States. Approximately 500,000 additional illegal immigrants make it to the United States each year, mostly from Mexico. This number is supplemented by 800,000 more legal immigrants. These numbers are causing economic disruption, particularly in border states. Moreover, a certain disrespect for the law is cultivated when so many people bypass normal, albeit cumbersome, legal immigration procedures.

Most Americans are ambivalent. Being a nation of immigrants, we recognize that immigrants rejuvenate and enrich the country. In the short term, immigration may suppress wages, but in the long term immigrants add wealth. Without immigrants, Americans would not be reproducing themselves. Young immigrants will provide an important source of income that will support retiring baby boomers. However, illegal immigration is unfair to those who wait in line and it permits no way to appropriately vet and assimilate new immigrants.

No rational immigration policy, whether to increase or decrease the immigration rate, can be implemented without first controlling the borders. Indeed, one of the defining obligations of a sovereign nation is to control its borders. The question of what levels of immigration are desirable and manageable cannot even be properly posed unless borders are controlled. Hence, the first goal of immigration legislation must be to secure the borders. The exact manner of achieving this is an empirical question that can be explored. Certainly it will involve some combination of barriers or fences, increased border patrols, and high-tech surveillance. No border will ever be entirely secure, but the 500,000 per year number needs to be radically reduced.

The more difficult question is what to do about the immigrants that are already here. Simple justice would demand that they be deported. However, the numbers are so large as to make this impractical. America would not want to become the sort of intrusive state necessary to locate and deport 11 million people. Humanitarian issues would dreadfully complicate matters. Many illegal aliens have children who were born here and thus American citizens. One would be faced with the prospect of splitting children from parents or forcing young American citizens to accompany their parents to Mexico or some other country.

On the other hand, to grant even an “earned” amnesty to these people would encourage others to cross the borders in the hopes that one day they also would be granted amnesty. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 granted amnesty to millions of illegal immigrants, with the promise that future immigration would be controlled. Whether because of government lethargy or the tremendous allure of jobs in the United States, that promise was never kept. The public is, therefore, realistically reluctant to accept similar assurances now.

A reasonable compromise would be to tie the effectiveness of border control directly to amnesty. Consider the present 500,000 number of illegal aliens crossing the border each year as a starting point. Allow one year for the implementation of effective border control. After that point, make sure that the sum of the estimated number of illegal immigrants per year, plus the number of increased allowed immigration, plus the number of current resident illegal immigrants granted amnesty totals 500,000. If the illegal border crossings do not decrease then there would be no amnesty and no increase in the number of allowed immigrants.

For example, if the border enforcement is say 80% effective then 100,000 illegal immigrants would still be illegally entering the country. In such a case, we would add 200,000 to the additional number of legal immigrants allowed and 200,000 current resident illegal immigrants would be granted amnesty. If the border enforcement effectiveness wanes, then so to would the number of illegal immigrants granted amnesty.

This plan would have the virtue of making it in the best interest of current resident illegal immigrants and those who wish to legally immigrate to support effective border patrol. It would also provide continuing leverage on the federal government to maintain border security.

The numbers proposed here are just notional. One could imagine giving different weights to increasing the number of legal immigrants or legitimizing the ones already here. If the borders seemed secure over an extended number of years, the process of granting amnesty could be accelerated. Since there would likely be more applicants seeking amnesty than might be granted, one could give priority to those who had assimilated by learning English and who had been here the longest.

In any case, acceptable and reasonable immigration reform begins with a secure border.

`I was ordered to fight all men until they say, `There is no god but Allah.”’ — Prophet Mohammed.Islam is radically distinguished from its sister religions, Christianity and Judaism, by the political circumstances of its origin. Judaism and Christianity were at various times persecuted religions. In one of the key narratives of Judaism, Hebrews were slaves to the Pharaoh in Egypt before they were delivered by God. In the defining narrative of Christianity, Christ is put to death by the Romans. Although His Resurrection represented a triumph over death, it did not represent a political victory. By contrast, the rise of Islam, under the leadership of Mohammed, combined religious conversion with military triumph. Even decades after Christ, Christians remained a minority sect subject to the rule of the Romans. While within a couple of decades, Islam had spread, largely by force of arms from Iraq to Egypt. Within a century, the Islamic Empire had spread to India, North Africa and Spain. In its largest extent, the Islam Empire sandwiched Europe between Spain and Constantinople.

To be sure there were times when Christianity and Judaism claimed both religious and political power. The Pope at times has exercised both political and religious authority and to this day rules the small sovereign principality of Vatican City. Judaism’s kings are chronicled in the Bible, perhaps the most well known being David. In modern Israel, rabbis still do exercise some authority with respect to some civil matters like weddings, but religious freedom is institutionalized. Despite the occasional overlap between religion and state, in the ethos of Judaism and Christianity the two remain different spheres.

Until perhaps the death of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I, there was no real separation between religious and civilian authority in the Islamic world. Certainly, there is little indigenous Islamic philosophy and theology to support such a separation.

Such a separation, or at least a distinction, had long been recognized in Judaism and Chrisitianity. Since its Diaspora, Judaism has largely remained a modest-size religion with limited or no direct political power. With the rise of the Enlightenment, Christians in particular created a philosophy and theology that not only recognized the different roles of state and religion, but also the necessity of religious freedom. Authentic faith cannot be reached by force, but only by persuasion and personal witness.

Modern Muslims, many who have migrated to the West (formally Christendom) have internalized this same perspective. However, in much of the Middle East, there has been less reconciliation between political and religious authority.  Although freedom of religion is ostensibly codified in the Afghan Constitution, the current case of the forty-one-year-old Abdul Rahman, who faced death in Afghanistan for converting to Christianity is a sad reflection of the intensity of a medieval perspective on religious freedom.

In the current issue Commentary Magazine, Efraim Karsh’s “Islam’s Imperial Dreams” explains how the ideology of Imperial Islam animates much of Islamic terrorism. Dreams of conquest both religious and political motivate Islamofacism that seeks the restoration the Islamic Empire and the imposition of Sharia Law.

Perhaps these grandiose ambitions are partially fueled by the conspicuous disparity between the fortunes of many Islamic nations and their self-image. It could once be reasonably claimed that the Islamic Empire represented one of wealthiest and most technologically advanced civilizations in the world.  Now, many such nations are dependent upon the West for technology and most of what wealth there is relies on the depleting good fortune of sitting upon oil reserves. The modern lands of the former Islamic Empire are not an important the source of art, literature, science or technology. If one ties worldly success and religious righteousness, Islam is not fairing particularly well.

Karsh notes that this sort of tension has been a continuing source of violence:

“In the long history of Islamic empire, the wide gap between delusions of grandeur and the centrifugal forces of localism would be bridged time and again by force of arms, making violence a key element of Islamic political culture.”

Here in lies Karsh’s key warning. The West cannot hope to cope with Islamic terrorism until it recognizes how tightly coupled are visions of an Islamic Empire and violence.

Islamofascism and its attendant terrorism may be suppressed and isolated, but it will continue until there is a widespread acceptance in the Muslim world of key tenets of modernity: a separation of religion and civil law and religious tolerance.

Three years ago just before the war to liberate Iraq began, the iconic Conservative of the age, William F. Buckley, Jr., observed that “What Mr. Bush proposes to do is to unseat Saddam Hussein and to eliminate his investments in aggressive weaponry. We can devoutly hope that internecine tribal antagonisms will be subsumed in the fresh air of a despot removed, and that the restoration of freedom will be productive. But these concomitant developments can’t be either foreseen by the United States or implemented by us. What Mr. Bush can accomplish is the removal of a regime and its infrastructure. The Iraqi people will have to take it from there.”

The United States military, led by President George Bush, accomplished the first task in short order and with minimal destruction and loss of life. The second task is still underway. Though the collective decision of Iraqis in the long run will be dispositive, the burden is not entirely theirs. The likelihood that democracy and freedom will take root depends on the fertility of the Iraqi soil, and, over this, the US has little control. However, in the short run, democratic sprouts need to be protected from the predations of radicals who would prematurely trample these promising seedlings.

The recent sectarian violence provoked by attacks on mosques has raised the question as to whether the spin up of violence will throw apart the fragile association of Shiite Arabs, Sunni Arabs, and Kurds that were previously forcibly crushed together under the brutal and bloody boot of Saddam Hussein. The media devoted almost hysterical attention to the violence, perhaps too willing to assume the worst. According to General George Casey, Commander of Multinational Forces in Iraq, the violence has been challenging but exaggerated by press reports.

Nonetheless, the press reports have persuaded Bill Buckley that, despite our best efforts to nurture freedom and representative government, the Iraqis have already chosen violence and authoritarianism. “The great human reserves that call for civil life haven’t proved strong enough. No doubt they are latently there, but they have not been able to contend against the ice men who move about in the shadows with bombs and grenades and pistols.” Buckley concludes that the ambitious assumption that democracy would grow under these conditions has now been refuted by the evidence and we need to take a different direction.

However, Buckley’s pessimistic assessment is perhaps premature. Despite the violence, there have been a number of positive signs that are too often neglected. There have been three elections where the Iraqi people bravely endorsed representative government even though voting entailed, in some cases, great personal risk. A constitution has been agreed to and we hope that a new permanent assembly will soon be formed. This progress is remarkable considering that Iraqi democratic muscles have atrophied under decades of forced inactivity.

Violence against people and mosques are hardly the acts of indigenous groups popularly supported by the people. If the insurgents really had deep and wide popular support then elections not violence would be their key to power.

Part of the reason that violence has been directed against civilians is that insurgents have been frustrated in their attacks against Coalition forces. Though the numbers of Coalition deaths per week ebb and flow, they have shown a steady decline in recent months. This decrease in effectiveness against Coalition troops is even clearer in the more statistically reliable injury rates. Violence against civilians represents military and political weakness not strength.

Buckley’s conclusion that the Iraqis are perhaps not ready yet for democracy is perhaps best refuted by the fact that the alternative policy, the policy of acquiescing to tyrants in the region, failed to bring stability in the past. Al Qaeda rose in power to a point of being able to execute a massive terrorist attack killing 3,000 Americans in New York and Washington during a period when the approach of “realism” rather than democracy guided American foreign policy.

Iraqis must still choose the kind of people they want to be and the government they want to have, but our faith that democracy will take hold is a necessary faith. The alternative is a return to the conditions of September 10, 2001.

When the English settlers in America broke loose from Great Britain and founded a nation at the end of the eighteenth century, the prospects for a republican form of government, a government that derives its authority from the assent of the governed, were not clear. Could such a nation survive and prosper? Indeed, over eighty years later the United States fought the Civil War testing whether, in the words of Abraham Lincoln “any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure.” Fortunately, that question was answered in the affirmative, but not before hundreds of thousands of Americans died.

The rapid spread of democracy in the latter half of the twentieth century makes it easy to forget that democracies do not always successfully take root. Regular elections are a necessary, but not sufficient condition for democracies. Democracies also rely on the rule of law and transparency in public commerce. Democracies depend on a mature political culture. People must be willing to respect the political process and the liberty of others. People in successful democracies recognize that sometimes political decisions do not go your way. Political losses are not a reason to take up arms.

In his book The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad, Fareed Zakaria argues that wealth is a key component to successful liberal democracies. He cites the scholarly work of Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi who found that per capita income is highly correlated to the longevity of democracies. In countries with a per capita income of $1500 (in current dollars) or less, a democratic government lasts only eight years. Longevity increases with per capita income. The values between $3000 and $6000 appear to define a transitional range, where the results could go either way. Frankly, for democracies to survive a majority, or at least a strong plurality, must have an economic stake in the survival of democracy. The advantages of maintaining democracy must out weigh the disadvantages of loosing transient political arguments so that citizens internalize the self-imposed disciplines of democracy.

With the bombing of the Golden Mosque of Samarra and the attendant unrest leading to even more deaths, Iraqis appear to be reaching a critical political point. Will the various groups, the Shiites, Sunnies and the Kurds realize that a small minority is deliberately trying to sow violence? Will they allow their tribal and religious sensitivities to overwhelm their judgment and reward those who would destroy a mosque for political advantage? The question reduces to whether enough Iraqis have a sufficient stake in a democratic and free Iraq to isolate and remove extremists.

Iraqis are rightly proud that their land was the “Cradle of Civilization.” But those glories are millennia old. Before the Iraqi people is a real and present choice whether to be the cradle of democracy in the Middle East or to descend into internecine violence. Ultimately, it will be an Iraqi decision, one that cannot be made on their behalf.

Perhaps we should cling to the optimistic hope that this bombing could split Arab Sunnis from those foreign insurgents with whom they have been allied. After all, if the country descends into chaos, Arab Sunnis are dramatically outnumbered. If Iraq splits into Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish regions, the Kurdish and Shiite regions will be oil-rich and the Arab Sunni region will be oil-poor. In a very real sense, Sunnis have the most to loose if Sunni extremists manage to divide the nation into separate countries or provoke Shiites and Kurds into a militant response.

Of note here is the fact that the CIA World Factbook lists the current per capita income of Iraq as $3400. This places Iraq on the dangerous end of countries that may or may not maintain long-term democratic institutions.

“You will never be happier than you expect. To change your happiness, change your expectation.” — Bette Davis.

The most famous sentence in the Declaration of Independence, the sentence which captures the philosophy of the document andthe views of the signers of the Declaration, is: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” The entire purpose of government is to insure these rights. The Declaration does not claim that happiness itself is a right. We can only demand of our government the scope of freedom necessary to pursue happiness.

Well, how successful are we, and how effective has our form of government been? Although happiness is not guaranteed, it would seem that those countries that appear to have happier citizens are the countries most adept at creating environments where happiness can be pursued. The Harris Polling Corporation has performed a number of inter-country polls that show that Americans are a happy lot, happier, in general, then their European counterparts.

A recent study of Americans by Pew Research confirms the general happiness of Americans. About 34% claim to be “very happy,” 50% are “fairly happy,” while only 15% were “not too happy,” 1% did not know. These divisions have been consistent since 1972, when the polling began, through many presidents and good and bad economic times.

The Pew polling suggests that even among Americans there exist systematic differences in degrees of happiness. Some of their results are expected. For example, married Americans are happier than unmarried ones. Approximately 43% of married Americans claim to be very happy, while only 24% of unmarried Americans make the same claim. The regularity of attendance at church is also directly correlated to happiness, with church regular attenders consistently happier than others who attend church sporadically or not at all.

Counter to the admonition that money cannot buy happiness, Pew’s research found that wealthier people are happier than the less affluent. Only 23% of people in families with less than $20,000 a year of income claim to be “very happy,” while 50% of those with household incomes over $150,000 are happy. Of course, the causal direction of this relationship is not clear. Does having more money make people happier, or are happier people more productive and adept at earning money

One interesting result of the Pew polling is that Republicans are consistently happier than their Democratic friends. About 45% of Republicans say they are very happy, while only 30% of Democrats do. At first glance one might guess that the difference between Republicans and Democrats might simply be a reflection of differences in income. If Republicans are more affluent that might explain their greater claim on happiness. However, according to Pew “If one controls for household income, Republicans still hold a significant edge: that is poor Republicans are happier than poor Democrats, middle income Republicans are happier than middle income Democrats, and rich Republicans are happier than rich Democrats.”

Perhaps happiness is associated with a feeling of control over our lives, of being the masters of our own destinies. Certainly, this would explain why rich people are happier than poor ones. The more wealth one has the greater the scope of control over life one enjoys. More money means we can live where we wish to live and engage in those activities that please us. Does this feeling of control associated with happiness explain the differences between Republicans and Democrats?

The Republican ethos is associated with individuality and the conviction that we are independent agents, responsible for our own lives. In the Democratic perspective we are victims of others or of unfortunate circumstances. Victims require a government to protect people from misfortune.

Now Democrats would argue that they are trying to increase happiness by making community resources available to the less fortunate and there is merit to the argument. However, they can not consistently view the world as a nasty place from which we all need protection without internalizing dependence and victimhood. This greater perceived reliance on others, the notion that our well-being is in the control of outside forces, leads Democrats to feel powerless. Of course, there are Democrats that are self-reliant and Republicans who require government help. However the more the one embraces the general view that one is largely responsible for one’s own pursuit of happiness, the happier one is likelier to be.

This is one reason Democrats are so frustrated. They can’t seem to wipe the smile off of Republicans faces.

History is the combination of the singular and the general. There are points in history when it is clear that the actions of a single person or a small group of people re-directed the flow of history. There are also large political and economic forces that drive history. For example, the Industrial Revolution altered everything from the availability of consumer goods and means and strategies for war making.

While it is possible to learn from singular events or individuals, it is not possible to predict with confidence when such singularities will occur. Americans have been uniquely blessed with the ability to usually choose the right leaders for the right times and the ability to suffer graciously through the less apt choices. President Abraham Lincoln was one of the singular individuals who changed history.

In drawing lessons from history, present day observers often reveal more about their own political perspectives by picking and choosing historical events to buttress their own judgments than recognize the broader truths of history. Writing in the Boston Globe, Robert Kuttner wants President George Bush to read and learn from Doris Kearns Godwin’s Team of Rivals about Abraham Lincoln. Through warmth of personality and “generosity of spirit,” Lincoln was able to pull together his political rivals into a cabinet that led a divided country through the Civil War. Kuttner argues that, by contrast, Bush wins by dividing rather than uniting.

It is more than a little presumptuous to expect of anyone the rather unique capacities of Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln pulled together his rivals for the Republican presidential nomination in 1860. Indeed, William Seward was the odds on favorite to win the nomination, while Lincoln was the compromise candidate the party turned to at the last minute. In a very real sense, Lincoln needed a unity cabinet within his own party more than George Bush.

Perhaps Bush would have been better served by asking Senator John McCain, his competitor in the primaries of 2000, to be his Vice-President or to join his Cabinet. In 1860 William Seward and Salmon Chase carried with them large followings in the Republican Party. They brought their wings of the party to Lincoln’s Administration. At best, McCain has a modest Republican following with a large appeal to independents. It should be remembered when Bush chose Dick Cheney, Collin Powell and Donald Rumsfeld for Vice-President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense, respectively the general consensus was that he had selected experienced and mature advisers. The Cabinet was not viewed as divisive.

Kuttner’s real argument is that Bush has been unnecessarily divisive and he appeals to Lincoln to diminish Bush. While one might be able to find an ill-chosen statement or two, Bush has been largely collegial. He has certainly not engaged in the vitriol of the Democratic Party Chairman Howard Dean who proudly proclaimed, “I hate Republicans and all they stand for.” Nor has Bush matched Democratic Senator Minority Leader Harry Reid who had to apologizing for telling high school students of Bush, “I think the guy is a loser.” Even in the heat of a political campaign, Bush never labeled an adversary’s policies as “unpatriotic” as General Wesley Clark did when he was running for the Democratic Presidential nomination.

It is impossible to argue against the proposition that we would all be better off if Bush had more of the qualities of Lincoln, especially Lincoln’s rhetorical capacity. However, there are some intriguing similarities between the Lincoln and Bush Administrations that Kuttner might have observed in Team of Rivals if his mind were less welded shut with ideology. Here are a few examples:

Team of Rivals begins with a quotation from the New York Herald of May 19, 1860 after Lincoln won the Republican nomination:

“The conduct of the Republican Party in this nomination is a remarkable indication of small intellect, growing smaller. They pass over… statesman and able men, and they take up a fourth rate lecturer, who cannot speak good grammar.”

Perhaps this snobbish arrogance with regard to Lincoln could serve as a salutary lesson to those on the Left who divide their time between arguing that Bush is a dolt or an evil genius.

During the Civil War the “Peace Democrats” or `Copperheads” were a faction of the Democratic Party who constantly argued for peace, searching for a compromise that would leave the country divided with slavery intact. Has Kuttner considered the lesson that perhaps some Democrats are yielding to the same temptation with regard to the War on Terror?

Seward was a leading light in the Republican Party, a well-educated lawyer from New York. As Secretary of State, many were convinced that Seward was the real power behind Lincoln’s Administration. Lincoln was the untutored Western puppet tethered to Seward’s strings. This miscalculation is presently mirrored in the assertion that Bush is a figurehead behind the real powers, Vice-President Dick Cheney or alternatively political adviser Karl Rove.

Both Lincoln and Bush suffered under ineffective or self-aggrandizing subordinates. Lincoln could never persuade General George McClellan to wage an aggressive campaign on Confederate Armies, while the general spent his time complaining and blamed others for failures. McClellan is reminiscent of terrorism adviser Richard Clarke, who through two administrations managed not to deal effectively with the Al Qaeda threat, yet always managed to paint himself as the put upon hero.

While Seward was a rival that became a friend and confidant to Lincoln, another rival Salmon Chase effectively managed the Treasury in the Cabinet, but would not relinquish his presidential ambitions. He constantly worked behind the scenes to undermine Lincoln, confident that the Republican Party would turn to him in 1864. Lincoln tolerated this while he needed Chase at Treasury. When Chase submitted his resignation in a fit of pique over a Treasury appointment, Lincoln quickly accepted the resignation and replaced Chase with a more congenial person. This is reminiscent of Collin Powell’s experience. Though Powell was not seeking the presidency, he and professionals in the State Department were quietly undermining presidential policies through leaks to the press. At the end of the first term, when Powell submitted his resignation, Bush quickly accepted. He replaced Powell with the supportive Condoleeza Rice. Powell did not even last to the second inauguration.

Godwin’s Team of Rivals reminds us of many important lessons we can learn from Lincoln and how truly singular Lincoln was. As usual, the Left ignores the most important lessons and reveals an animosity to Bush not unlike that endured by Lincoln.

“Bush lied and people died” is the mindless refrain that substitutes in some quarters for trenchant political analysis. The suggestion is that Bush lied about the presence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to lead us into war in Iraq. Of course, a lie is not simply an error in fact; it is an act whose intent is to deceive. It is truer to say that the assertion that “Bush lied” is itself a lie, or at least an attempt to obscure the truth.

Before the war, there was broad consensus in the American intelligence community that Iraq possessed some significant quantities of chemical or biological agents as part of a weapons of mass destruction program. This was also the consensus of foreign intelligence services.

William Cohen, President Bill Clinton’s Secretary of Defense was “absolutely convinced that there are weapons… I saw evidence back in 1998 when we would see the inspectors being barred from gaining entry into a warehouse for three hours with trucks rolling up and then moving those trucks out.” Even Senator Edward Kennedy argued, “We have known for many years that Saddam Hussein is seeking and developing weapons of mass destruction.” The list of high officials, including former President Bill Clinton himself, who agreed with this assessment, is long.

That was the pre-war belief. Now we know the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) found only a couple of dozen WMD shells. This is consistent only with the sloppy unaccounted residue of a previous larger WMD program. However, the ISG also concluded that Iraq was biding its time and planned to resume it WMD program as soon as sanctions, atrophying by 2003, were lifted. Specifically they wrote: “There is an extensive, yet fragmentary and circumstantial, body of evidence suggesting that Saddam pursued a strategy to maintain a capability to return to WMD after sanctions were lifted by preserving assets and expertise. In addition to preserved capability, we have clear evidence of his intent to resume WMD as soon as sanctions were lifted.”

However, questions remain. If Saddam had no significant quantities of WMD, why did he behave as if he had WMD by continuing to impede the weapons inspectors? Why did he eventually kick the inspectors out of Iraq? If he had simply complied with the UN’s inspection regime, he would not have suffered billions in lost revenue associated with the sanctions. What happened to the stockpiles of anthrax that Saddam’s regime originally claimed? There was no evidence of its destruction and as inspector Hans Blix argued one does not simply loose track of WMD, “Weapons of mass destruction aren’t like marmalade”

After the liberation of Iraq, there were stories that stockpiles of WMD were sent to Syria before the war. These reports were recently buttressed in the book Saddam’s Secrets by General Georges Sada, a former general of the Iraqi air force . Sada claims the that Iraqi civilian airliners were modified and filled with WMD by members of the Republican National Guard, and flown to Syria under the guise of civilian air traffic. Sada’s source for this report was the pilots who flew the flights.

The explanation that Saddam removed his WMD to Syria is not a pleasant development because it arms a cruel regime with powerful weapons. However, it does have the virtue of closing the logical circle. It resolves the pre-war intelligence about WMD with the lack of stockpiles after the war.

By all accounts, Sada retains considerable credibility and he is soon to be briefing some US Senators. Nonetheless, Sada’s story remains a third party account, rather than eyewitness testimony. While persuasive, it cannot alone be considered definitive. However, it is an important piece of evidence that needs to be evaluated in the context of other clues. This is story that begs for investigative reporting that does not seem to be forth coming. People are just too comfortable with the conventional wisdom that there were never where WMD in Iraq.

It is very possible that the Administration is already convinced that WMD managed to find its way to Syria, but has not publicly made the case. It might prefer to endure the political damage and loss of credibility about pre-war intelligence than be forced at the present time to deal directly with Syria.