Frank’s Case Book

“Why was the U.S. Senate so fixated on protecting jobs instead of protecting lives? The U.S. Senate’s refusal to grant this president and future presidents the same power that four previous presidents have had will haunt the Democratic party worse than Marley’s ghost haunted Ebenezer Scrooge. Why did they put workers’ rights above American lives? Why did that 2002 U.S. Senate — on the one-year anniversary of 9/11 — with malice and forethought, deliberately weaken the powers of the president in time of war? And then why did this Senate — in all its puffed up vainglory — rear back and deliver the ultimate slap in the face of the president by not even having the decency to give him an up or down vote on his bill? This is unworthy of this great body. It is demeaning and ugly and over the top.” — Senator Zell Miller, Democrat Georgia, as cited by the Weekly Standard, October 7, 2002.

In Trenton, New Jersey, September 23, 2002, at a campaign stop, President George Bush urged the Senate to pass the Homeland Security Bill. Bush’s words:

“I asked the Congress to give me the flexibility necessary to be able to deal with the true threats of the 21st century by being able to move the right people to the right place at the right time, so we can better assure America were doing everything possible. The House has responded, but the Senate is more interested in special interests and not interested in the security of the American people. I will not accept a Department of Homeland Security that does not allow this president, and future presidents, to better keep the American people secure. And people are working hard in Washington to get it right in Washington, both Republicans and Democrats. See this isn’t a partisan issue. This is an American issue.”

Bush foolishly and unfairly used the phrase, “not interested in the security of the American people” which can legitimately be interpreted as suggesting that the Senate leadership does not care about security. However, the entire context of the speech also emphasizes bi-partisanship and that “both Republicans and Democrats” had been working together. The speech was certainly not has harsh as some have portrayed. Nonetheless, there was certainly enough ammunition for political hacks to venture onto the cable news programs to fret about Bush “politicizing” defense and security issues.

One would have expected that someone of the stature of Senate Leader Tom Daschle to have delegated this sort of rough-and-tumble argument to others. He could have at least expressed his dissatisfaction in his usual quiet manner. Perhaps it was so much more satisfying to delay Senate business and storm to the Senate floor to whine that Bush had politicized the debate. Rather than maintaining a detached dignity, Daschle exploded in am embarrassing fit of pique. The press painted a picture of the normally dormant Daschle erupting in a lava of complaint.

If this were not enough, Democratic, Senator Robert Byrd, who now that Senator Strom Thurmond is retiring is vying for the title of “Senator Who has Served Too Long,” rose to call Bush’s words “despicable.”

All of this, of course, occurred in a context when, former Vice-President Al Gore, who was perhaps setting himself up for a presidential bid in 2004, wondered out loud why Bush was asking for authorization to use military force “in high political season.” Are we to suppose that important issues should be dealt with only in odd-numbered years? Democratic Congressmen Jim McDermott, who recently visited Iraq, informed us that Bush would lie to get us into a war with Iraq. Others have suggested that Bush’s focus on Iraq it a cynical attempt to draw attention away from a weak economy. Or there are the old standby arguments that Bush wants to go to war with Iraq to help the oil industry or to complete in unfinished job of his father in the Persian Gulf War. The polarization of the debate occurred long ago.

Of course, politicians politicize. That is what they are supposed to do. That is what they should do. If Daschle did not want the Iraq issue to be politicized, why did he and others insist that the matter should be submitted to Congress for debate? You can only avoid politics if there is no room for disagreement.

The real problem is that the issues of attacking Iraq and going after Al Qaeda ought to be debated and argued about. It ought to be a political issue. Hashing out these decisions in public is what democracies are all about. There are principled reasons to question Bush’s approach to these issues. Perhaps we ought to resign ourselves to live with Saddam Hussein equipped with nuclear weapons and hope that our own weapons arsenal will act as a sufficient deterrent. Perhaps not. Let’s argue about it.

There are some Republicans who have misgivings, but Democrats appear to be burdened with the most doubts. Except for a few politicians like Senator Edward Kennedy and Congressman Dennis Kucinich, Democrats have been so worried about their prospects in the upcoming elections that their voices have been muted. Even formerly loud and articulate voices like Paul Wellstone’s have fallen almost silent. In 1990, he spoke out passionately against the Persian Gulf War. Now that he is involved in a tight election battle, his sense of moral indignation seems to have fled him.

Daschle is boxed in. The resulting sense of frustration is probably partially responsible for his eruption on the Senate floor. You can tell that like in 1990, in his heart of hearts, he wants to oppose Bush on Iraq, but he does not want to pay the political price, especially with control of the House and Senate in question. Daschle would rather change the argument to who is politicizing what. It is hard to understand why one would want to go into politics if not to debate the important issues of the day. What could be more important than the debate about war? For most Democrats, the Iraq issue is certainly not a “profile in courage.”

The isolation of two large oceans makes most Americans happily immune to a preoccupation with foreign affairs. We expect everyone to be like us, content to raise our families and indulge in commercial pursuits. We simply do not pay very much attention to foreign affairs, even affairs that may be crucial to our well-being. For most Americans, Iraq and Saddam Hussein are issues that concerned us ten years ago, when the US and its allies liberated Kuwait from the Iraqis. Most troops returned home to cheers and parades. Events in the region during the post-Gulf War period made the news, but were largely ignored. Nonetheless, the Gulf War and its aftermath do provide some illuminating insight into the American political landscape.

In the run up to the Gulf War, the Vietnam-era, Democratic anti-war movement had moved into full gear. Extrapolating from the Vietnam experience, there were dire predictions of a quagmire in the desert and massive American casualties. Congress very reluctantly approved military action. A majority of Democrats (including the current Democratic Senate Leader Tom Daschle) and all of the Democratic leadership refuse to endorse military action. The Democrats were deeply and viscerally opposed to any military action and were convinced that sanctions should be used to remove the Iraqis from Kuwait. If that counsel had been followed, Kuwait would now be a province of Iraq.

Despite the military success of the Gulf War, George Bush (41) was not re-elected. Americans once again proved that economic problems trump success abroad. Bill Clinton was elected in 1992, as a “New Democrat” driven less by ideology and more by practicality. Bill Clinton embraced this “practicality” in helping to implement the arms inspection regime to insure that Saddam Hussein was ridding himself of weapons of mass destruction.

For a few years, we believed we were largely successful. It was not until an Iraqi defected that we appreciated the full extent of Iraqi’s program for obtaining weapons of mass destruction. The inspections were a key element in the agreement that suspended hostilities. In the ensuing years, the arms inspectors played a cat and mouse game with the Iraqis. The Iraqis delayed and stalled to prevent a full and complete inspections regime.

By February 1998, Clinton was convinced that Iraqi intransigence implied they were seeking weapons of mass destruction and would use them. In a call for action, Clinton argued that Hussein’s “regime threatens the safety of his people, the stability of his region, and the security of all the rest of us. Some day, some way, I guarantee you, he’ll use the arsenal. Let there be no doubt, we are prepared to act. I know the people we may call upon in uniform are ready. The American people have to be ready as well.”

Unlike the call for action by George Bush (41), this call was welcomed by the Democratic leadership, including Tom Daschle, who co-sponsored Senate Concurrent Resolution 71. The resolution authorized the president to “take all necessary and appropriate actions to respond to the threat posed by Iraq’s refusal to end it’s weapons of mass destruction programs.”

Why were some Democrats so reluctant to authorize the use of force by the first President Bush against Iraq, eager to so empower President Clinton, and again squeamish about support for the second President Bush. Some Republican and Conservative critics argue that Democrats have no real position and are just playing politics with national defense issues. That explanation is far too simplistic.

Despite the grant of military authority to Clinton by many Democrats, others in the party were far less sanguine about permitting open-ended discretion. Senator Richard Durbin (D) of Illinois confessed that the broad language of the resolution made him uneasy. Senator Max Cleland (D) of Georgia drew a close analogy with Vietnam, explaining that “there shouldn’t be a rush to judgment…as there was with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.” While embracing the idea of broad executive authority in domestic affairs, with some exceptions, the core of the Democratic Party is disinclined to grant such authority to a president and is deeply and habitually distrustful of anything military.

Daschle and other Democrats did not really abandon their scruples about US military intervention. The reason that Daschle and others were so willing to grant Clinton military authority and are parsimonious about such grants to both George Bushs is that they fully understand the consequences of such grants. They know that both Bushs were likely to fully employ and exploit such authority. On the other hand, they understood that Clinton would be unwilling to expend much political capital in going after Saddam Hussein with the full military force necessary.

President Clinton would say the right words about Hussein’s regime and warn about the dangers of weapons of mass destruction. Clinton’s Secretary of Defense, Richard Cohen, would emphasize that continued Iraqi intransigence would put “Security Council credibility on the line [and]…US credibility as well.” However, in the end, he would not be willing to commit the necessary forces to disarm Hussein’s dangerous regime. Passage of Senate Concurrent Resolution 71 was essentially a no-cost action by Democrats that would provide political cover for their antipathy towards the use of military power.

They were right. By October 1998, Iraq ended all cooperation with arms inspectors. Despite the United Nations resolutions, there would be no more inspections in Iraq for weapons of mass destruction. In December 1998, coalition forces launched four days of air strikes, no doubt doing significant damage to Iraqi capabilities. However, after thrashing about for four days, the assault ended. Iraq had successfully remove arms inspectors and were now free to pursue plans for biological, chemical, and nuclear capabilities, while Americans and British provided only a token response. For Iraq, the strategy has worked for at least four years.