Frank’s Case Book

The New Republic editor Peter Beinart is smart, articulate, literate, and politically lonely and isolated. He is perhaps the ranking member of the dwindling responsible Left. It is people like Beinart that keep the term “responsible Left” from becoming an oxymoron. In The Good Fight: Why Liberals — and Only Liberals — Can Win the War on Terror and Make America Great Again, he makes the case that a only Liberals, in the tradition of the great Cold War warriors, Presidents Harry Truman and John Kennedy and Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson, can execute a credible strategy to deal with the challenge of Islamofascism. The fact that many of Beinart’s fellow Leftists and Liberals are not quite sure there is really a “War on Terror” makes this task more difficult. Indeed, Beinart’s critiques on the execution of the War on Terror are more likely to be considered seriously by the Right rather than the Left.

Beinart begins with a tutorial history of the Cold War that should remind modern Liberals of the fateful and important choices they made at the Cold War’s beginning. For much of the 1930s, the Left was very sympathetic with the Soviet Union and what were perceived to be its progressive social policies. After World War II, the seizure of Eastern Europe and the blockade of Berlin made it apparent to all but the ideologically blinded that the Soviet Union was not a real ally but a totalitarian regime. Nonetheless, important elements of the Democratic Party steadfastly embraced alliance with the Soviet Union. Henry Wallace, former Vice-President for President Franklin Roosevelt, even went so far as to oppose the Marshall Plan to rescue Western Europe economically because he feared that such a plan threatened the Soviet Union. It was Harry Truman and his contemporaries who realized that supporting progressive policies at home was consistent with opposing totalitarianism abroad, even from Socialist regimes.

Despite the fact that the Cold War was finally won during a Conservative Administration and long after Liberals abandoned any pretense of being anti-totalitarian; Beinart’s bases his assertion that the War on Terror can only be one by Liberals on three theses, none of which bears critical scrutiny.

Multilateralism: Beinart argues that the War on Terror may require military intervention, but such intervention is legitimized by the endorsement of multilateral organizations. Moreover such organizations can lend expertise in reconstruction.

While it is true that Liberals pay greater lip service to multilateralism and boast a greater deference to international opinion the differences in practice are not obvious.

In both Gulf Wars, the Bushes, father and son, took their case to the United Nations and secured Senate votes of support before intervention. In both cases the UN did not endorse action, but a rag-tag alliance of the willing was form dominated by the US. Though there was greater international support for the first Gulf War, both Bushes paid a decent respect to the opinion of mankind.

By contrast, Bill Clinton did not secure Congressional approval for intervention into Kosovo. He did not even attempt to secure approval from the United Nations, knowing that Russia would veto any action. Ultimately, he pulled in (or was pulled in by) NATO to deal with a European problem in which the United States had no vital interest.

In two of the most pressing international confrontations, Iran and North Korea, the Bush Administration has steadfastly involved its allies. It has given the lead to the Europeans on Iran and is insisting on including Japan, China, Russia, and South Korea in talks with North Korea. The real irony is that many Liberals who argued for multilateralism are now urging the US to eschew other countries and negotiate one-on-one with Iraq and North Korea. Former Clinton Administration officials are even recommending that the US preemptively strike missile testing facilities in North Korea. Who is seeking to act unilaterally now?

Economic Development: Beinart plausibly argues that poverty and hopelessness breeds terrorists. Conservatives are willing, in Beinart’s world, to fund wars and political development but short funding for economic development. This is sort of a mirror to Beinart’s perception of domestic parsimony by Conservatives. Without such true economic development, anti-terrorists efforts will not succeed. Beinart criticizes the Bush Administration for ignoring Arab economic development. He argues for an Arab Marshall Plan, analogous to the one instituted by hawkish Democrats to provide for European reconstruction after World War II.

Only Liberals, according to Beinart, are inclined to do this. Beinart forgets that although Truman pushed for the original Marshall Plan, it was not solely a Liberal effort.� The plan passed by wide margins in a Republican Congress and was endorsed by Republican Presidential candidates Harold Stassen and Thomas Dewey. Aid to Europe continued under the Eisenhower Administration, though Eisenhower was not a Liberal. Economic development aid can at times be a wise prescription, but both sides of the political aisle can recognize its advantages.

Moreover, Beinart’s calculation of how much aid is provided the Arab world neglects non-governmental organizations that are usually far more effective than direct government aid. The original Marshall Plan worked, in large measure, because there was a middle class culture in Europe than needed mostly economic resources for development. In many places in the Arab world massive economic aid would at best be squandered inefficiently or at worst be siphoned off by corrupt leaders. The US has invested over $50 billion into Egypt since 1979 with only modest economic development and little movement toward a pluralistic democracy.

Much of the Arab world does not lack funds, but rather requires a political structure and culture that would encourage both economic and social development. One of the chief sources of terrorists is Saudi Arabia which is awash in oil riches, but has not managed to provide true economic development for its people.

Taxes: One can not read a Liberal political track very long before an increase in taxes is urged. Beinart argues that the War on Terror needs resources and Conservatives are not willing to raise the necessary funds through taxation. Beinart believes the Department of Homeland Security is under funded. If anything, recent evidence suggests that the Department of Homeland Security is not particularly efficient at using the resources that it has.

As far as overall resources are concerned, Beinart must have finished the final draft of his book before the statistics on a rapidly falling deficit were in. Not only is the deficit falling, the debt load of the country is at historically sustainable level because of the massive growth spurred on by taxes cuts early in the Bush Administration. The US debt load compares very favorably with the debt load of the stagnant economies of Europe who suffer under far higher tax rates than the US.

However, the key flaw in Beinart argument does not fall under these three theses. Rather, it is the nostalgic illusion that any significant portion of the Democratic Party is serious about terrorism. There is no core Democratic vision for dealing with terror save more law enforcement. For the most vocal in the Democratic Party, the real threat to the US is the Bush Administration and not terrorists. More importantly, Liberals have not articulated a vision of American greatness.

The core of the Democratic Party has only two positions on the Iraq War: get out soon or get out now, with nary a concern as to whether the government that remains has the ability to deal with both security and economic development. The Democratic argument is not that Iraq is so secure or its government so capable that they do not need our military help, but that we should leave regardless of the security situation. There are few if any anti-totalitarian Democrats in the mold of Harry Truman, John Kennedy, Hubert Humphrey or Scoop Jackson left. Perhaps the only conspicuous Democrat that could be so classified is Senator Joe Lieberman who, a few short years ago, was the Vice-Presidential nominee for the Democratic Party. He is under a severe primary challenge by Ned Lamont, a MoveOn.org-sponsored candidate. Party heavy weights like Senators Russ Feingold and John Kerry, refuse to state a preference on the outcome of the primary. How can Beinart’s argument that the far-Left, Michael Moore wing of the party should be shed be considered seriously, when that wing of the party is busy clipping off moderate Democrats? Beinart plainly pines for a party that has long ago disappeared.

Beinart’s book is engaging and well-written. Conservatives would do well to take to heart many of his critiques. However, we should all hope that the sub-title of his book is mistaken. If only Liberals can win the War on Terror, then it will not be won.

Maintaining a measure of consistency in opinion over time can be difficult. Often, it is easy to avoid thinking thoroughly through one’s positions without appreciating their full import. This is especially true when statements are separated by substantial gaps of time. However, when conspicuously contradictory statements are juxtaposed, yet pass unrecognized as incongruous and oxymoronic, lunacy prevails.

On June 23, 2003 the New York Times revealed a “secret Bush administration program” that allowed the government access to international financial transactions to track terrorist financing. The program centers on a Belgium financial clearing house, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT). According to the article, the program is legal and effective. The NY Times’ report also actually describes terrorists who had been apprehended as a consequence of the program.

Immediately, the President and others criticized both the original leak of the information and the decision by the NY Times to publish despite bi-partisan requests that the paper show uncharacteristic restraint. In the wake of this criticism, the Boston Globe picked up on the talking points of the Left, and ran an article five days later entitled “Terrorist funds-tracking no secret, some say”. Since nothing was revealed, the NY Times did nothing wrong.

The unseen hilarious incongruity is either the SWIFT program was, as the NY Times reported, “secret” and important enough to be on front page of the paper, or it was common knowledge. Both conditions cannot be true. Moreover, if terrorists are being caught, then the program could not be very common knowledge. Once again anti-Bush animosity blinded normally sane people from seeing the obvious.

Publishing leaked classified information can arguably be consistent with journalistic standards, if the program was either illegal or being abused. The NY Times itself makes no such claim. Moreover, relevant members of Congress were being informed. Republican and Democratic politicians, including vocal Administration critic Representative John Murtha (D-PA), and Democratic co-chair of the 9/11 Commission, Lee Hamilton, urged that the NY Times not divulge the program. The paper was not persuaded.

Why then would the NY Times publish the article? The key may lie in the unintentionally revelatory statement by Bill Keller, executive editor of the NY Times: “We remain convinced that the administration’s [italics added-FMM] extraordinary access to this vast repository of international financial data, however carefully targeted use of it may be, is a matter of public interest.” The editor’s concern was not the general government’s access to listing of financial transaction, but this “administration’s” access.

It is also worthy to note that in a June 25, 2006 piece, Editor Bill Keller explained his decision “to disregard the wishes of the President and his appointees.” But he does not bother to mention that he was disregarding the wishes of not only the President but people on both sides of the aisle and in Congress as well. Again we see the pattern of an almost pathological fixation on the Bush Administration.

The editors have been eloquent in explaining the necessity of a free press and the obligations of such a press to be responsible what it chooses to publish about national security matters. However, they have been unable to offer a sustainable reason why it was necessary or important to reveal the details of this particular program at this particular time.

It is no secret that the editors of the NY Times pretty much don’t like this Administration. Anything that might conceivably cast it in a negative light is given great weight, perhaps even outweighing possible compromises in the nation’s ability to deal with terror. Annoyance with the President has clouded the judgment of the paper. Perhaps the paper suffers because there are not enough Conservatives in the newsroom to provide balance. Regardless of the reason, because the editors of the NY Times are not sufficiently introspective to recognize their own biases, the paper, the country, and the War on Terror all suffer.

“We begin with the common belief that Saddam Hussein is a tyrant and a threat to the peace and stability of the region. He has ignored the mandated of the United Nations and is building weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them.” — Senator Carl Levin (D-MI), September 19, 2002.

The issue of weapons of mass destruction WMD is a central question concerning the liberation of Iraq. Before the operation by Coalition Forces in 2003 began, there was a broad and deep consensus among leaders of both the Democratic and Republican Parties and indeed the world that Saddam’s Iraq had retained a portion of his stockpiles of WMD from the pre-1991 war era and was still actively seeking such capability and the means to deliver them. All of these activities were in direct violation of the cease-fire agreement with Coalition Forces in 1991 as well as numerous United Nations resolutions.

In the immediate aftermath of the war, the Kay and Reports clearly demonstrated that Saddam’s Iraq was trying to maintain WMD capability and extend its ability to deliver them, though no stockpiles of WMD were found. The categorical “no WMD” assertion was not technically correct because about 30 chemical weapons were found. This number was small enough that it could be believed that the Saddam regime may have lost these to sloppy accounting. The headlines could still “No WMD Stockpiles Found.” Rhetorically speaking, it was possible for some to assert that Bush lied to us about WMD with the same certainty that they assured us before the war that such weapons existed.

It has always been intuitively unsatisfying to believe that Saddam had really come clean with regard to WMD, yet still would not allow international inspectors to unequivocally certify it. After all, interfering with international inspectors cost the regime billons in oil revenues that it might have otherwise enjoyed. Some suggest that interfering with inspectors was a big bluff by Saddam in order for him to save face in the Arab world. In retrospect, if Saddam’s regime had turned over its WMD in the first months after the first Gulf War, sanctions would have ended in a year and the regime could have re-started its WMD program in a few years financed by increasing oil revenues. The bluff would have been irrational. Though, it must be conceded that Saddam has often miscalculated.

One explanation is that some of the WMD had been transferred to Syria prior to the second Gulf War. There is precedent to this behavior in that prior to the first Gulf War, Saddam’s sent some of his Air Force to his implacable enemy Iran rather than see them destroyed by Coalition Forces. Iran declined to return the planes. It is not commonly known, that the Duelfer Report specifically did not rule out such a weapons transfer. In a recent a book Saddam’s Secret, a former Iraqi Air Force General Georges Sada asserts that weapons were moved to Syria, though his sources are second-hand.

Now we find that in the years since the completion of the Duelfer Report, additional weapons have been found. The weapons are in widely varying states of operational readiness, but now the number totals 500, certainly enough to be considered a stockpile. This certainly less than might have been expected based on pre-war intelligence, but still remains a critical conclusion. Unfortunately this new information contradicts the story line of the past couple of years and consequently has difficulty fighting its way into a mainstream media that already has its mind made up.

It seems that such news released by Republican Senator Rick Santorum (R-PA) from previously classified documents would be front page news whatever assessment one makes of the credibility of this new information. If the released report is true, it must compel a re-assessment of the conventional wisdom about WMD stockpiles. If the evidence is weak, then it speaks negatively of yet another attempt by some who supported the initial invasion to desperately justify their decision. This latter point is key. If the newly released report is false or misleading, then that would provide powerful evidence of deception and play into the Left-wing assertion that “Bush lied.” The day after the release there was scant evidence of it in the mainstream media. It was not a top AP story. Does the scant coverage actually provide evidence of the report’s compelling credibility?

The Washington Post on June 23, 2006 relegated the story to page A10, under the rather self-serving headline, “Democrats Criticize Claim on Iraqi Arms.” While several days later, the front page of the Sunday Washington Post ran a story, probably leaked from the CIA on how prior to the war the CIA warned against the credibility of a “fabricator” who was providing evidence of pre-war WMD in Iraq. The former story officially released by a Senator contracting the story line of “no WMD” is buried or ignored, and a story from an unnamed source supporting the “no WMD” narrative is featured on the front page.

It is clear that the “no WMD” is the mainstream media’s story and they are sticking to it.

When light is absorbed and refracted by the atmosphere, the resulting light spectrum often says as much about the nature of the intervening atmosphere through which it passed as it does about the original source of light. In much the same way, the manner in which a person responds to news is as much a measure of perspective of the person as it is about the news.

Consider for example, the news of the past couple of weeks. Information came to light that suggested, but has not yet proved, that some US servicemen deliberately killed civilians in Haditha, perhaps in a fit of rage. Why certainly no one condones the alleged actions, those opposed to the Iraq War were quick to seize on the incident as a metaphor for all the challenges that have occurred in Iraq and tried to tie the incident to the Bush Administration. Those against the war wanted the incident, no matter how rare or atypical, to become a metaphor for the war. The fact that painting with such a broad brush might also taint the large majority of US service people who have behaved nobly and bravely seems some how lost or is less important than the opportunity to damage the Bush Administration.

This last week, in a well-coordinated and professional attack, the US military in conjunction with Iraqi forces managed to kill Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. He was the Al Qaeda terrorist who entered Iraq before the Coalition liberation and has sparked sectarian Sunni and Shiite violence. By brutally targeting and killing Iraqi civilians, many times woman and children, Zarqawi has kept alive the violence.

No morally serious person is displeased with the outcome. While our better natures might be uncomfortable with rejoicing at the death of any human being, we can all be delighted in knowing that some people will likely be saved from future terrorist actions and still others might be dissuaded from following Zarqawi’s lead.

Most public officials, even those opposed to American involvement in Iraq, have expressed their approval at Zarqawi’s death. However, Democrats could only bring themselves to praise troops and refused to grant the Administration any credit. Senate Democratic leader Harry Reid, stated that “This is a good day for the Iraqi people, the U.S. military and our intelligence community.” It would too much to expect much praise of President George Bush.

Perhaps most revealing is the initial reaction of some on the Left. One can check out the web site called the Democratic Underground to obtain a glimpse of the loonier Left wing.

In the hours after Zarqawi’s death, the first reaction was denial followed by the assertion that Zarqawi was not really as bad a guy as painted by main-stream media and the Administration. Then came the suggestions that this particular operation was planned for Bush’s political advantage. Here are some selected Democratic Underground posts from the morning of June 9, 2006.

”Sorry. Don’t buy it.”

“ABC has a highly detailed special report going. breaking late night… They’ve been blaming him [Zarqaewi] for every ill for the past 15 minutes. Oil rigs, hotels, the UN compound, Nick Berg. (ABC says he actually killed Berg himself). This guy was a regular one man super army. Such BS. The boogey man Goldstein is finally dead? Right.

“Convenient too that this would happen now… guess we should just all forget about that Haditha mess, the fact that we are approaching 2,500 dead and the fact that our economy is in big trouble.”

“Gawd! Please, no disrespect — but this is only `a tool’ that is used by the BushBotBorg to pick-up morale. It sort of equates to 1984 Announcements that our `chocolate rations’ will be upped for the next month.”

“It’s all the distraction in the news media and that average people can not keep it all straight. Anew I see the value of the DU [Democratic Underground], because of smart people who catch this sort of thing.”

Of course, the Democratic Underground is aptly named since it is the cesspool into which the scum of the Left drain. Yet, one wonders about the embarrassment saner Democrats must feel when Representative Peter Stark from California averred that the entire Zarqawi killing was a stunt, “just to cover Bush’s [rear] so he doesn’t have to answer” for the events in Haditha. Former Democratic presidential candidate and Ohio’s 10th District representative in the House of Representative, Dennis Kucinich, dismissed Zarqawi as only a small part of the insurgency.

The natural inclination of most Democrats like other Americans is to be overjoyed at the removal of a brutal enemy of Americans and Iraqis. However, such is the state of American politics that anti-Bush anger makes it difficult for some to accept good news lest it reflects positively on the President.

Between February 13 and 15, 1945 during World War II, the British Royal Air Force and the US Air Force firebombed the German city of Dresden. Dresden was a beautiful Baroque city near the eastern border of Germany. Firebombing by Allied forces consisted of dropping explosives which destroy structures, especially roof tops, followed by incendiary explosive designed to ignite a firestorm. The ensuing firestorm not only destroys building but is particularly lethal to people on the ground.

The purpose of the bombing, particularly near the train stations, was to prevent the Germans from rapidly exchanging troops from the Eastern and Western fronts. Despite this ostensible motivation, thereremains a critical question as to whether the destruction of life was proportionate to the net benefit to the Allied war effort. Recent scholarship suggests that 25,000 to 35,000 Germans on ground were killed.

Though Dresden was an important transit point, it did not contribute to the German war effort to the extent of other cities.  On this basis, many now claim that the bombing of Dresden was a war crime. In retrospect, at best the Allied commanders were too cavalier is balancing the level of possible civilian casualties and shortening the war. Perhaps there was more than a little revenge for the bombing of London poisoning the hearts of Allied commanders. This assessment is re-enforced by the comment of Arthur Travers Harris, Marshall of the Royal Air Force, who wrote, “I do not personally regard the whole of the remaining cities of Germany as worth the bones of one British Grenadier.”

Nearly 60 years later, American troops needed to suppress insurgent actions in the Iraqi city of Fallujah, which had become an insurgent haven. US troops urged as many civilians to leave the city as possible. At this point, it would have been possible to literally and thoroughly destroy the city from the air. However, to do so would have risked remaining civilian lives and made reconstruction both from a physical and political stand point more difficult. American troops went through Fallujah house-by-house and door-by-door to root out insurgents. About 1,000 insurgents were killed and 92 Americans gave their lives so that many Iraqi civilians would live.

We cite these disparate examples to illustrate the extreme care and sensitivity with which the Iraq War has been conducted. The number of American and Coalition casualties is higher than it otherwise would have been because of efforts to conduct a just war. This is what makes aberrations like the prisoner abuse by a minority at Abu Grab and an alleged massacre by US forces at Haditha so disappointing and so out of character.

After Dresden, Paul Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi Propaganda Minister, used the bombing to undermine the moral authority of the Allies for political purposes. He showed pictures of destruction and exaggerated the number of civilian casualties by a factor of 10. No doubt, the modern heirs to the Goebbels tradition will exaggerate Marine and Army mistakes. We hope that this exploitation will not be aided by American news sources that are so angry at President George Bush that any bad news will be exploited.

No one argues that the press should not aggressively follow and report the Abu Grab and other stories. However, to write about these without balancing the coverage with positive stories of American soldiers or without other context is knowingly misleading. When this happens, the American press fails in its responsibility to inform. It allows the modern Middle Eastern counterparts to Goebbels to exploit American errors.

Unfortunately, the goal of the angry Left is to embrace events like Abu Grab a metaphor for the Iraq War even if in the process it unfairly paints American soldiers as barbarians. By most accounts, the overwhelming fraction of soldiers have behaved honorably and nobly taking increases risks to save Iraqi lives. Some on the Left become upset when it is suggested that they don’t support the troops. Unbalanced reporting or excessive criticism of isolated errors by American troops without perspective renders them fairly susceptible to such criticism.

Up until the nineteenth century, federal jobs were patronage positions awarded on the basis of a spoils system. When a president took office, he filled federal positions with those who had supported him. The result was that jobs could be filled with incompetent, yet politically loyal partisans. As the government grew, this lack of professionalism became a greater and greater disadvantage. To alleviate this situation, Congress passed the Pendleton Civil Service Act in 1883 to protect federal workers from political influence and to create a Civil Service that hired and promoted on the basis of merit rather than political connection.

The Civil Service System protects both federal workers and politicians. While political appointees are responsible for representing the policies of elected officials, the bulk of the Civil Service can provide professional, non-partisan support. Of course, most federal positions do not require any particular political perspective. The day-to-day operations of most aspects of government are apolitical.

However, at the higher echelons of government the distinction between the political and the professional begin to blur. Policy and the implementation of policy are so intertwined that non-political appointees may influence policy. Nonetheless, whenever civil servants believe that it is within their prerogative to deliberately circumvent policy from elected officials, they begin to undermine both democracy and the Civil Service. This becomes particularly dangerous when this happens in intelligence agencies. A Commerce Department that strays is not nearly as dangerous as an intelligence agency that seeks to directly circumvent the direction of elected officials. This is what makes the most recent actions by individuals in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) so worrisome.

Some of the current problems began with Ambassador Joseph Wilson. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, on the basis of his wife’s recommendation, Wilson was sent to Niger to look into the extent that Iraq was seeking uranium yellow cake. This might indicate Iraq intentions with regard to Weapons of Mass Destruction.

The selection of Wilson for the trip was peculiar at best given that he had no background in investigation or nuclear technology. When he returned, he was not required to file a written report on this sensitive issue. Even more abnormal was the fact that Wilson was not, as is the usual practice, compelled to sign a confidentiality agreement. This left him free to pen a Bush-bashing piece in the New York Times. Over time, the 9/11 Commission Report debunked much of what Wilson wrote. However, given all the irregularities, as Victoria Toensing, former Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Reagan Administration explains, the “CIA conduct in this matter is either a brilliant covert action against the White House or inept intelligence tradecraft.”

Before the 2004 election, the book Imperial Hubris, critical of the Bush Administration was published anonymously by a CIA employee. Ultimately, Michael Scheuer revealed himself as the author. CIA employees sign a confidentiality agreement which requires that any open publications be vetted by the CIA. Usually such vetting is a pull-and-tug affair with disagreements at the single-word level. Scheuer first had problems when speaking publicly about the book when the CIA thought it was being criticized, but according to Scheuer, “As long as the book was being used to bash the president, they gave me carte blanche to talk to the media.”

Most recently, Mary McCarthy was fired from the CIA for leaking highly-classified information. The popular assumption is that she was the source of the leaks about the CIA detention of high-level Al Qaeda operatives in East European facilities. McCarthy was on the Clinton Administration National Security Council under Sandy Berger who was last seen pleading guilty to the unauthorized removal of classified documents. After the Clinton Administration ended, McCarthy found her way back to the CIA, but remained politically active, contributing substantially to the John Kerry campaign and the Democratic National Committee. There is some suspicion that her leaks were politically motivated to embarrass the Bush Administration.

The leaks from McCarthy were especially troublesome because it revealed an ongoing covert operation and identified companies that were involved. This certainly added risk to individuals acting on behalf of the United States.

Some argue that Mary McCarthy was a whistle blower nobly revealing inappropriate and perhaps illegal government activity. However, such an argument ignores the special and unique position of trust Mary McCarthy held. She was entrusted with classified information, upon which perhaps people’s lives and intelligence sources depend.

If McCarthy was acting on the basis of conscience, there are a number of honorable actions she could have taken. She could have vigorously fought within the CIA for her position. She could have gone with her concerns to members of the Senate or House Intelligence Committees who had the appropriate clearances. Finally she could have resigned in protest. By not following this route she undermines her case for conscientious objection. Instead, she hid in anonymity and selectively leaked to the press. Perhaps she was brave in risking exposure, but certainly her acts were not principled, noble, or honorable.

One can measure the transformation of the Left over during the Bush Administration. The Left once considered the CIA the embodiment of evil, but now is happy if certain members of the CIA deliberately undermine civilian leadership, so long as that leadership is President George W. Bush.

“However, I can tell you that beyond the Beltway in dusty and dirty places like Ft. Benning, Ft. Stewart, Ft. Hood, Ft. Campbell and Ft. Bragg, where officers wear BDUs instead of Class Bs that there are tens of thousands of Officers, Commissioned/Warrant/Non-Commissioned, that would go to hell and back for this Secretary.” — Lieutenant Colonel in the United States Army.

Even at the beginning of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s tenure in early 2001, Washington insiders expressed doubt that Rumsfeld would survive in office very long. The reason the press was uncharacteristically infatuated with the elderly secretary was the same reason that some believed he was not long for his position. In the early days of the Bush Administration, the press was supportive of Rumsfeld because he was perceived to be fighting the generals. Now that he is pursuing policies the main stream media disagrees with, these same people eagerly rush to find generals willing to criticize Rumsfeld.

From the beginning, Rumsfeld wanted to transform the military from the slow and powerful behemoth necessary to counter the heavy military of the Warsaw Pact to a lithe and rapid force more suitable for dealing with the asymmetric threats the US was more likely to face. He wanted to grant more discretion to the war fighters on the ground rather than to maintain a highly-centralized command protocol. As opposed to having many specialized units controlled by a remote command structure, Rumsfeld preferred smaller more self-contained, self-directed, and independent units.

Independent of the merits of such a transformation, Rumsfeld was bound to encounter stiff resistance from military officials skilled and comfortable with the status quo. The fact that Rumsfeld was insistent and even arrogant in pushing for this transformation does not mean that his approach is correct, but it does mean that he made, and apparently continues to make, enemies.

That some generals are disgruntled with civilian leadership in the conduct of the Iraq War is not surprising. Such tension is nearly as old as the Republic:

* The most conspicuous case was General George McClellan who led a lackluster and passive effort for Union forces in the Civil War. McClellan would refuse to attack even with superior forces and would always find ways to blame others for his lack of success. After being dismissed by President Abraham Lincoln, McClellan ran as the Democratic nominee against Lincoln in 2004 calling the Civil War a “failure” and urging “immediate efforts for a cessation of hostilities” on the basis on negotiations with the South.
* Certainly, General Douglas MacArthur believed his strategy in Korea was superior to President Harry Truman’s and did not feel constrained by Truman’s directives. Truman was finally forced to recall MacArthur from Korea.

* Whether in fact true or not, there was a conventional wisdom in the military that political leadership did not allow the military to execute a victory strategy.

In Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime, Eliot Cohen, of Johns Hopkins University, examined four cases of war time political leadership: American President Abraham Lincoln in the Civil War, the Wartime Premier of France, Georges Clemenceau in World War I, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in World War II, and Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion in the Israeli War of Independence. Cohen’s thesis is that while military strategy is important, ultimately war is a political enterprise, best led by political leaders. In some sense, acquiescence to the generals is not even possible because military advice from different experts is often contradictory, and partially based on institutional rivalries. Sometimes the best military tactics are not the best political options, effective civilian leadership does not just leave war fighting to the generals.

Questions about tactics for the Iraq War remain an important question for scholarly debate and consideration. Some believed we should have gone in with more force. Some more recent analysis suggests that the US footprint was too big. However, to debate these strategies in the public context of trying to force a Rumsfeld resignation in the midst of a war is more political than analytical. A thoughtful critique would have postponed excessive consideration of past tactics and constructively focused on using what we have learned to implement improved strategies. As Victor David Hanson has commented:

“Equally fossilized is the ‘more troops’ debate. Whatever one’s views about needing more troops in 2003-5, few Democratic senators or pundits are now calling for an infusion of 100,000 more Americans into Iraq. While everyone blames the present policy, no one ever suggests that current positive trends — a growing Iraqi security force and decreasing American deaths in March — might possibly be related to the moderate size of the American garrison forces.”

Though no one can be very sure about the complete motives of others, the very personal nature of the attacks on Rumsfeld suggests that more than military strategy is at play here. A few generals from those forces that are being the most radically transformed by Rumsfeld’s emphasis on a leaner force — the Army and the Marines — generals with the most vested in the status quo force strategy are the source of anti-Rumsfeld antipathy. There is information inherent in the fact are no recently retired admirals and air force generals among those calling for Rumsfeld’s resignation.