Frank’s Case Book

The historical record on bombing civilians as a psychological tactic to dishearten civilian populations has, at best, a mixed record of effectiveness. The Nazi “Blitz” of London during World War II from 1940 to 1941, was devastating. It resulted in the deaths of 43,000 people, many of them civilians. The Blitz did not force surrender, but it served to harden the resolve of Britons against the Germans. The suffering caused by bombing did not grow into an excuse for self doubt, but acted as a source of strength to redouble efforts against the Nazis. Likewise, the strategic bombing of Germany by the Allies, particularly by the British who were somewhat bent upon retribution, did little to break the will of the Germans. The disruption of oil supplies to the German war machine helped defeat the Nazis, but the bombing of civilians did little.

In a more modern example, in 1999, NATO forces bombed Belgrade. The bombing was not directed at civilians, though civilians were inadvertently and inevitably killed. Rather than being cowed, civilians defiantly mocked the attacks by placing bull’s eyes on their backs. The bombing added burdens to the civilian population, but it was not intimidating. It was not until NATO threatened the use of ground forces, that the Serbian government led by Slobodan Milosevic conceded defeat.

It seems that the only people that are intimidated by bombing attacks on civilians are Western progressives who appear obsessed with the question, “Why do they hate us?” Of course, there is no crime, real or imagined, that justifies actions deliberately calibrated to kill as many innocent civilians as possible such as the attacks on September 11, 2001. Some of these terrorists harbor lingering anger toward the Crusades or the expulsion of Muslims from Spain, events that occurred centuries ago. Perhaps the real source of Muslim anger is a sense of economic vulnerability caused by the fact that much of the Muslim World has not embraced modernity. What wealth there is a consequence of the fortune of sitting on deposits of natural resources like oil. It not based on the creativity of the once advanced and proud Islamic culture. Many Middle Eastern Muslims simply feel threatened by the ubiquity of Western Culture.

The focus on the question “Why do they hate us?” is a measure of the rejection of the full history Western Culture by the Left. The continuous quest by the Left to blame the West for terrorist acts is very analogous to battered wife syndrome. In such cases, a wife rationalizes domestic abuse by believing that she must have done something wrong to merit a beating, a beating that no wife deserves. Such women often refuse to press charges against their abusive husbands even when there is police intervention. Battered wife syndrome is usually a consequence of low self-esteem. Likewise, it is hard to escape the suspicion that the Left remains intensely self-loathing, convinced that they are a part a fundamentally unjust and racist society deserving of hatred. They can see many reasons why they hate us.

Wife abusers are encouraged by the low self-esteem of their victims. It is no small irony that radical Islamists are encouraged by the weakness evident in the self-doubt of the Left. They despise a culture that when bombed asks, “Why do they hate us?”

Perhaps the only modern war in the Mideast that can be said to have led to a continuing peace was the Yom Kippur War in October 1973. After the humiliation of the Six Day War when Israeli forces captured the Sinai from Egypt, the West Bank from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria, Anwar Sadat, the President of Egypt, realized that it would be impossible to make peace with Israel and save face. Any peace would have to appear to be an agreement among equals.

Israeli complacency and military hubris grew in direct proportion to Egypt’s embarrassment. Israel was convinced that its vaunted intelligence service would make them aware of any planned attacked well in advance. During the Six Day War, Arab troops were undisciplined and ill-trained. At the first contact they retreated. The behavior convinced the Israelis that they could deal with any Arab military threat.

Enamored of their prowess, Israel was surprised by the military assault launched by Egypt and Syria on the Jewish holiday day. For the few days, the Arab armies had the momentum as the Israelis were caught on their heels. The Arab troops were aggressive, they effectively used new anti-tank weapons, and the Israeli Air Force was largely neutralized by new anti-aircraft missiles provided by the Soviets.

The Israelis counterpunched by devising new tactics to circumvent the effectiveness anti-tank weapons. After the Egyptians pushed too far ahead of their anti-aircraft installations, the Israeli Air Force decimated columns of Egyptians. In a counter attack, the Israelis pushed across the Suez Canal and were marching to Cairo. With the Egyptians still on the east side of the Suez and the Israelis wrapping around the southern end of the Suez, a cease fire could be called with both sides on fairly even turns. The Israelis were clearly on the offensive and the Egyptians regained a measure of military respect lost after their pitiful performance of seven years earlier.

In the aftermath of the war, Sadat had the courage to travel to Jerusalem and make peace with the Israelis. The Israelis made a trade of land for peace that has lasted. For his efforts, Sadat was assassinated by the same radical Islam that has since come to power in Iran and animates Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. The land-for-peace-formula has been employed since then in Lebanon and Gaza, but no peace followed. The Israelis offered land for peace in the West Bank and rewarded by the civil unrest known as the Intifada. The difference is that there is not another Anwar Sadat genuinely seeking peace.

In some ways the current conflict of the Israelis with Hezbollah in southern Lebanon has similarities with the Yom Kippur War. Israel was convinced that they could make easy work of the Arabs, but the Hezbollah fighters have fought tenaciously and made life complicated for Israelis by deliberately mixing among civilians. Israeli intelligence was surprised by the quantity and sophistication of weapons that had been smuggled into southern Lebanon from Iran via Syria.

After initially trying to use surgical strikes to push out Hezbollah fighters, Israel was amassing troops for a large more overwhelming initiative. At this writing this initiative is being thwarted by the cease fire agreement signed by the UN Security Council and agreed to, at least for now, by Lebanon and Israel. The extent to which Hezbollah will comply with any agreement is not clear, given that the UN Resolution 1559 which called for the disarmament of militias in southern Lebanon was ignored by Hezbollah.

In the current conflict, if the result can be spun as a victory by Hezbollah (a draw equals a Hezbollah public relations victory), it will not, as in the case of Sadat and the Yom Kippur War, provide an opportunity for peace. In this situation anything other than a clear victory by Israel, will embolden Hezbollah and other terrorists.

At the end of the Yom Kippur War, Israel was racing into Egypt just as Israel is now racing towards the Latani River, the original goal of the Israelis. Unless Israel is able to hobble Hezbollah before the cease fire takes place, it will continue to threaten northern Israel. If an all out assault by Israel has not cleaned up southern Lebanon, there is little hope that the Lebanese army even aided by UN troops will do so.

When this conflict began, the Bush Administration claimed it did not want a return to the status quo, where a cease fire did not bring security and simply led to more violence later. At this point, it is difficult to recognize much of a distinction between the status quo before the conflict and the present cease fire agreement. If that proves to be the case, it will be a loss for the US, Israel, and the Bush Administration.

For contrasting view points check “An Unmitigated Disaster” by Caroline Glick and “UN Resolution Meets Government Goals” by Herb Keinon.

Of some people and institutions we expect and demand scrupulously moral behavior. Of others, while we may not approve of their behavior, we expect the worse. Expecting the best can be ennobling. Expecting the worst not only provides an implicit excuse for bad behavior, but can represent a subtle form of bigotry. We are witnessing the classic case of the phenomenon in the current conflict between Israel and the Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.

One the one hand, we have Israel trying to free its northern border with Lebanon from the armed terrorist group Hezbollah. This goal is consistent with UN resolution 1559 which explicitly “calls for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias.” Israeli military actions have sometimes resulted in the death of innocent civilians. However, in large measure, the civilian deaths were a direct consequence of Hezbollah hiding themselves and their missiles in civilian areas including residences, schools, and mosques. Moreover, Israel has used door-to-door tactics to remove Hezbollah. They could have achieved the same goals by more indiscriminate use of air power. Instead, they have chosen a tactic that will cost more Israeli military lives, but will minimize civilian casualties. Yet, Israel is roundly criticized by the international community for the civilian deaths that do occur.

One the other hand, besides putting Lebanese civilians in jeopardy as a tactic of war, Hezbollah is launching Katyusha rockets into Israel. These rockets are so inaccurate that they can have no practical military value. Instead, they are lofted indiscriminately in the murderous hopes that they will kill civilians and terrorize populations in northern Israel. These rockets even include small metal pellets, a Syrian innovation, designed to cause as many casualties as possible. While these tactics are criticized, the criticism is milder, perhaps because we do no expect much of Hezbollah. These low expectations represent a form of anti-Muslim prejudice

If we find situations where the Israelis have, either accidentally or through other errors in judgment caused collateral damage, they should be criticized. No one is beyond criticism. Indeed, the Israelis have a robust tradition of self-critique.

However, we cannot permit such serious examination to draw a moral equivalency between Israeli and Hezbollah tactics. To do so is to provide an incentive for Hezbollah to use schemes that will maximize civilian causalities and to act as a terrorism enabler. If every time civilians were killed as a consequence of the deliberate intermingling of fighters and civilians by Hezbollah, Hezbollah rather than Israel were portrayed as the primary culprit, the tactic would cease to be of political advantage.

Of the fact that Hezbollah cynically facilitates civilian casualties, there can be no doubt. Even more gruesome, there is even evidence that Hezbollah imports in corpses from other areas as a propaganda ploy for the benefit of reporters.

World opinion can legitimately aim its rhetorical firepower at inappropriate use of military power, however unless it does so carefully it risks the collateral damage of a moral equivalency which encourages the use of civilian populations as shields. In such cases, the ill-place shots of world criticism can result in unnecessary civilian deaths just as surely as an errant bomb intended for a different target. In some significant measure anti-Israel world opinion encourages Hezbollah’s tactics and makes the world community unintentionally responsible for civilian causalities.

“The great questions of the day will not be settled by means of speeches and majority decisions but by iron and blood.” — Otto Von Bismarck, Prussian Prime Minister.

In 1984, I was afforded the opportunity to visit Israel for a two-week scientific conference. The El Al flight left from New York’s John F. Kennedy Airport and landed outside of Tel Aviv. The security of the flight was extremely strict by the standards of the time and even tighter than American post-9/11 security. Every potential passenger was questioned about the purpose of their trip. If you had bags transferred from another airline, you had to claim them and examine their contents to make sure nothing was added while the bags were out of your control. Any bags left in public places unattended were quickly confiscated.

The year 1984 was

• almost two decades after the Six-Day War when Israel fended off Egypt, Syria, and Jordan and seized the Golan Heights, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Sinai Peninsula;
• eleven years after the Yum Kippur War against Egypt and Syria;
• seven years after Israel and Egypt signed the Camp David Accords exchanging the Sinai for peace with Egypt;
• and three years after and three years after the IsraeliAir Force crippled the Iraqi nuclear program by destroying the reactor at Osirak.

One of the most surprising features about life in Israel was the ubiquity of automatic weapons. Soldiers always had them slung over their shoulders. Civilians carried them for protection even on school trips to tourist areas. The guns were a reminder of the precariousness of Israel’s position. Despite, and perhaps because of these weapons, we did not experience security problems. We drove around the country unhindered, visiting the Red Sea and Masada. We took a bus ride parallel to the Jordan River through much of the West Bank, toured the Golan Heights and the then quiet Israeli-Lebanese border, spent time at hotel in northern Israel, and visited the seaport at Haifa.

Now a drive through the West Bank might prove a little dangerous. If we ventured to the border with Lebanon or even to Haifa we would find ourselves within the range of Katyusha rockets raining down indiscriminately from Hezbollah-controlled southern Lebanon. What happened?

Allured by the success of peace with Egypt and relentlessly pushed by the Europe and the United States to take risks for peace, Israel has tried to apply the same formula with its other enemies. After rooting out terrorists from southern Lebanon, Israel retreated behind its internationally recognized border. As a consequence of the Oslo Accords, Israel has turned over much of the administration of the West Bank to Palestinian Arabs. Recently, Israel has withdrawn from the Gaza strip, even taking the politically difficult task of dismantling Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip.

Unfortunately, the actions have not purchased peace and security. Israel has been forced to erect a wall to keep out terrorists from the West Bank. It has had to re-enter the Gaza Strip to stop attacks that commenced almost from the moment of the Israeli exit. In contravention of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559, Hezbollah has been using southern Lebanon as a staging ground for anti-Israel attacks. Perhaps most despicably, Hezbollah is using private residences to store arms, inviting civilian causalities in the event of the present Israel military response.

The land-for-peace formula worked with Egypt, because Egyptian President Anwar Sadat genuinely desired to achieve some accommodation with Israel. However, with Palestinian Arabs, Hezbollah, and Hamas, no negotiations seem possible. These groups are institutionally committed to the destruction of the Israel and use any agreements as mere tactical concessions to enable future attacks. How is it possible for Israel to have a meaningful dialogue with a group that does not recognize Israel’s right to exit. Perhaps the worst part is that such groups have used their control to hide their own corruption and instill a new generation with an existential hatred of Israel.

Unfortunately for Israelis, Palestinians, and others in the region, the observations of Otto Von Bismarck, although made in a different historical context, may prove all too apt.