Archive for the ‘Economics’ Category

America Alone

Sunday, January 7th, 2007

The world is not at a loss for doomsday scenarios. During the 1970s, we were all concerned that the world would end in a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union. We were told that would exhaust the world’s oil and food resources before the current century. New worries have ascended to the top of the list of worries recently. There is always the possibility of a large asteroid smashing into the Earth and wiping out most of the life on the surface, much as a similar asteroid probably accounted for the rapid extinction of dinosaurs. Evidence is accumulating that the Earth is warming auguring significant climate change effects.

Of course, the danger of nuclear war with the USSR was real and we fortunately avoided it. This does mean that the dangers of nuclear weapons have entirely been eliminated. Predictions of natural resource shortages have proven unduly pessimistic, or at least premature. While it is certain that a large asteroid will, at some time in the future, be on a collision course with the Earth, the probability of an impact in the foreseeable future is tiny. The net effect of climate change is still speculative.

To these concerns, Mark Steyn adds one more in his American Alone. Steyn’s thesis begins with unassailable fact that much of the Western World, particularly in Europe is in demographic collapse. In order for any society to maintain it population it must have a fertility rate of about 2.1, i.e., women on average have 2.1 children. The European Union, as a whole, suffers under a weak fertility rate of 1.47 with some countries like Italy and Spain suffering with anemic fertility rates of 1.33 and 1.28, respectively. Literally, there are places in Europe which will become depopulated of ethnic European in one or two generations.

There are at least a couple of consequences of a declining and aging population. First, the generous social welfare states of Europe are dependent upon an influx of young people to support the pensions and increased medical expenses of retirees. Without such an influx these countries face economic stagnation and declining living standards. Second, culture is a reflection of the integrated perceptions and attitudes of its citizens. A demographically young culture is innovative and energetic culture, whereas a demographically older culture is likely to be risk adverse and focused on maintenance of pension checks.

Now, it is always possible that the fertility rates in Europe will undergo dramatic reversal. However, these rates have declined over decades and it difficult to foresee a circumstance that would change current trends. Moreover, Steyn argues that the European social welfare states are themselves nurture suicidal attitudes to reproduction. He writes:

“…a variety of government interventions — state pensions, subsidized higher education, higher taxes to pay for everything — has so ruptured the traditional patterns of inter-generational solidarity that Continentals now exist almost entirely in the present tense culture of complete self-absorption.”

The Muslim population is increasing the Europe due to both immigration and the high-fertility rates of immigrant populations. Steyn questions whether Europe can undergo dramatic demographic change and not undergo dramatic political change. Thanks to lavish funding of radical mosques by Saudi Arabia and others, the Muslim populations in Europe and elsewhere are becoming radicalized. Certainly, there are moderate Muslims and they probably constitute a majority, but radical Islam represents the Zeitgeist of the Islamic world.

Moreover, the self-absorption of modern secular welfare states saps culture confidence. What Steyn calls “culture exhaustion” will make it impossible for Europeans to resist the Islamic demands for deference. In Steyn’s assessment, Europe’s demographic and cultural death spiral is too far along to reverse. Before the end this century, there will parts of Europe where Sharia law is enforced. Great societies are not killed, but rather commit suicide.

Steyn writes American Alone with cleverness and humor that belies his deeply pessimistic message. America may soon represent the only remnant of Western ideals, of liberty and personal independence. The only hope Steyn offers is that the example of Europe’s demise will make obvious even to the American Left, the necessity to resist the clash of cultures. After all, a world dominated by Sharia law as practiced by radical Islamists is not that will be hospitable to gay or abortion rights, the key concerns of the modern American Left. It is not one where women will be treated with equal rights and dignity. It will represent a return to the Dark Ages, before the Renaissance and before the Enlightenment. As Steyn asserts, “…much of what we call the Western World will no survive the twenty-first century, and much of it will effectively disappear with our lifetimes.”

Abraham Lincoln described the American Civil War as a great test of democracy and liberty that would determine “if any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure.” The United States represents are far freer country with a far less protective welfare state. Nonetheless, the United States, over the decades, has moved steadily closer to the European model, though among modern industrial states it is still “exceptional.” If Steyn is correct in his assessment that European suicidal fertility rates are an inevitable outcome of the “Eutopian” welfare state, then the clash with radical Islam represents a test to determine whether a society so structured can long endure.

Reducing Income Inequality

Sunday, December 3rd, 2006

The Gini Index is a conventional measure of income distribution equality. A Gini index of 0 corresponds to every household having the same income, while an index of 100 corresponds to one person earning all the income. The Gini index in the United States tends to be a higher than in Western European countries. The US Gini index is about 45, while most European countries have Gini indices in the 30’s. However, this comparison can be misleading, since European countries individually tend to be more culturally and socially homogeneous than a large continental nation like the US. The more proper comparison is between the US and the entire EU. The total US population is comparable to that of EU and there are significant income disparities from country to country within EU that broaden the net EU income disparity. The per capita gross national product (GDP) in Denmark is $34,800 as compared to Poland who’s per capita GDP is about $13,100. Hence, income inequality for the EU as a whole can be substantially larger than that for any single European country. (See the CIA World Factbook for these figures)

There can be little statistical doubt that there has been a gradual increase in US household income inequality since 1980, with a particularly large jump in the early to mid 1990s. There are many causes for this increase. There has been a long-term change in the labor market valuing skilled as opposed to unskilled labor increasing the relative income of highly trained individuals. Households have changed, with more single-parent households which traditionally have had lower incomes. Even for a couple where both people earn a good income, divorce will drive down relative household income and putting them at a relative economic disadvantage. The rise in two-income families has widened household income disparity. Two people can generally earn more income than one person working outside the home. Moreover, high income individuals tend to marry other high-income people further exacerbating household income disparity.

There are two important values that seem to be at odds here. It is important for countries to maintain a sense of community identity and common purpose. This affinity can be attenuated with high levels of income disparity. On the other hand, we value meritocracy where earnings and achieve are not artificially limited by forced equality of outcomes. The more severe the meritocracy is, the greater the income disparity is likely to be. A common example of this effect can be found in professional sports where even members of the same team can earn radically different salaries based on their perceived contribution to the team.

It seems that dealing with widening income distribution with punitive tax policies is counterproductive. It reduces growth, which hurts the poor the most, and sets one income class against another income class. An alternate solution is to maximize social mobility in a couple of ways.

First, schools, particularly those for the poor, are largely a failure. The differences between public schools in affluent neighborhoods and poor neighborhoods will tend to broaden income distributions in the following generations. The introduction of vouchers for educational choice will broaden the range of educational options for poor children. It would also likely improve public schools in those very same poor neighborhoods.

Second, the collapse of families is correlated with all sorts of pathologies that curb the prospects of child in such families. As a culture we should encourage the maintenance of stable two-parent families and not pretend that all familial configurations are just as likely to produce successful and happy children. The government can help by easing the economic pressure on young families. One method to do this is to increase the dependent deduction, particularly for young children.

One thing is clear, unless changes are made on the front end of life, there will be little can be done on the back end to reduce the consequences.

We Have Reached a Consensus on Tax Rates

Saturday, November 25th, 2006

Over time, ideas can imperceptibly evolve from unthinkably naïve, to politically plausible, to conventional wisdom. The value of low marginal tax rates is one such idea that has taken root, at least in the United States. During World War II, the highest marginal tax rates were 94 percent. Given the economic demands of that war such confiscatory rates might be acceptable as a short-term expedient. However, marginal federal income rates remained over 90 per cent into the early 1960’s. Then President John Kennedy’s Administration worked to lower the top marginal rate to 77 percent with a resulting decade of high economic growth. The rates lingered in the 70-percent range through the 1960s and 1970s. As inflation cut in, more and more people were pushed into higher brackets and higher tax rates. By the 1970s, the US was suffering under double-digit inflation rates and unemployment rates of over 8 percent.

The Ronald Reagan became president in 1980. During the Reagan years the highest marginal tax rates gradually dropped from 50 per cent to 31 per cent, the result was higher growth rates, lower inflation, and lower unemployment. During the Clinton years in the 1990’s the highest marginal rates increased to 39 per cent, higher than 31 per cent, but still very low by historical or international standards. The Bush tax cuts decreased the top marginal rate to 35 per cent, pretty much the average over the last 20 years. Democrats enjoy railing about the about how drastic the Bush tax cuts are and how they might raise taxes, but no one is talking about returning the rates of the 1970s, much less the confiscatory rates before 1980. The Reagan tax revolution has become about as permanent as anything gets in politics.

Unfortunately, this consensus has not reached a Europe that still languishes with marginal tax rates over 50 per cent. Since 1991, the United States with low rates has grown at the average annual rate of 3.3 percent, while Germany and France with high tax rates have managed only 1.4 percent and 2.0 percent, respectively. While these growth rates may not seem very different, compounded over many years they result in dramatic differences. From 1991 to 2004, Germany grew by 19.8 per cent, France by 29.4 per cent and the Unites States, by a whopping 52.5 per cent. If the US had grown as slowly as Germany, it would have to raise the mean current tax rate by over 25 percent to obtain the same of revenue it now achieves at lower rates. The Europeans remain too smart to see the value of low marginal tax rates.

Kerry’s Foot Firmly in Mouth

Tuesday, October 31st, 2006

The words that people say are seldom considered outside of the context of the speaker who utters them. Speaking at Pasadena City College in California, Senator John Kerry and the former Democratic nominee for President said, “You know, education, if you make the most of it, you study hard, you do your homework and you make an effort to be smart, you can do well. If you don’t, you get stuck in Iraq.” Was Kerry saying that the American military is composed of the least educated among us or suggesting that President Bush’s lack of education is the reason he decided to go into Iraq? The plain meaning of the words suggests he was criticizing American troops, but it could have been awkward phraseology.

Part of Kerry’s problem is that he has a long history of saying pejorative things about American troops. During Vietnam he claimed that American troops had committed war crimes and that such crimes were wide spread. In 2005, Kerry charged American troops with “terrorizing kids and children” in Iraq. Moreover, the notion that American GIs come from those who do not do well in school arose during the Vietnam era when college students received draft deferments and others were conscripted. More than a few young men used college as a means of avoiding military service. Of course, this state of affairs has not existed since the decades-old all-volunteer army began. Perhaps Kerry’s mind set in firmed stuck in the 1960s.

Of course, Kerry could have, as he said, been making a bad joke about Bush’s intelligence and the fact that we are in Iraq. Jokes should not have to be explained, but no one ever claimed that Kerry has a talent for comedy. Ironically, Bush’s grades at Yale were at least as good as Kerry’s, but Kerry’s certainly judges himself Bush’s intellectual superior. Certainly, this conviction is what makes Kerry’s loss to Bush in the 2004 presidential election so frustrating to Kerry.

If Kerry is as smart as he believes he would not be making these clumsy statements. Nonetheless, he did manage to worm himself into a world of trouble during his Presidential bid with clumsy or perhaps revealing statements. With regard to a bill to support American troops in Iraq, he told an audience “I actually did vote for the $87 billion before I voted against it.”

Without looking into his soul, it is not possible to know for certain if Kerry was criticizing the troops or making a joke about Bush. However, it can be said with high confidence that he was probably trying to pander to his audience. That is his real problem.

Microcredit and Megacredit

Sunday, October 15th, 2006

Unlike some other Nobel Peace Prize winners, the winner for 2006, Muhammad Yunus, began the work for which he won the prize with his own money. In 1976, while an economics professor at Chittagong University in Bangladesh, he loaned local craftsmen $27 to help finance their businesses. This small generous gesture started a large and ultimately successful experiment in “microcredit.” Many small enterprises in poor countries fail because of the lack of capitalization. Conventional banks are reluctant to make such small loans, considering the poor to be bad credit risks. Part of Yunus’s genius was the use of credit groups where impoverished people would help each other in meeting their payments, in effect all members of the credit group act as guarantors of the loans to the credit group. In addition, Yunus focused most of the loans on women, who appeared generally more responsible in using the loans for the general benefit of the family.

Yunus’s success in Bangladesh is remarkable especially in contrast to typical foreign aid. Large-scale loans to impoverished countries generally are squandered in ubiquitous corruption. The inherent problem is that the aid gets filtered by governments, that if they were effective in the first place, there would be less need for foreign aid. Microcredit schemes represent an innovative way to bring the benefits of capitalism to the poor themselves. Credit and borrowing are a necessary component to growth. Yunus earned a Nobel Peace Prize for providing an effective modality for providing credit to the poor.

Both microcredit and “megacredit” made news in the same week. On the megacredit front, we learned that the annual US budget deficit continues its rapid descent as federal tax receipts grow even faster than government spending. The federal budget deficit for this year fell to $248 billion. Microcredit and megacredit are linked by the fact that liquidity and growth depend upon borrowing, whether for a handful of dollars or billions of dollars. Indeed, just as the use of credit is necessary for individuals to create wealth, it good for the US government to maintain a reasonable level of debt. There are two key factors that many on the Left and the Right do not often remember in assessing public debt:

  • A nominal budget deficit or surplus value must be normalized for inflation. When inflation is high enough, nominal budget deficits could even represent real surpluses. Even with a real budget deficit, if US growth is robust, the federal debt load can be decreasing.
  • A modest debt lubricates the economy and is a necessary requirement for growth.

Consider the current the deficit of $248 billion relative to the total US federal debt of $8.5 trillion. The inflation rate for 2006 is about 3.5%. This means that a nominal deficit of $298 billion would increase the total debt by 3.5%. Hence, for such a deficit there would be no “real” increase in the debt, or zero real deficit if the nominal deficit were $298 billion. Given the imprecision in computing the inflation rate, it might be too much to claim we are now running a real surplus with a $248 billion deficit, but we are certainly within measurement error of it. The only reason to reduce the deficits further is if we believe the debt load is too high.

The current debt load (the debt-to-gross-national-product ratio) for the United States is about 65%, and should optimally be somewhere between 40% and 80%. Beyond these extremes, economic growth is inhibited. For example, in the 1970s, the debt-to-GDP ratio was lower than 40% and we experienced stagnant growth and high unemployment. Indeed, in the late 1970s, inflation was so high we were really running budget surpluses with nominal deficits and suffered under the twin problems of “stagflation.”

It would seem that we are now running something close to the optimum yearly federal deficit with the optimum debt load. We should consider further significant reductions in debt carefully. Though we might wish to decrease the federal debt load in anticipation of increase liabilities as baby boomers begin to consume social security and medical benefits, reducing deficits too quickly could ultimately lead to economic stagnation.

Protesting Too Much

Tuesday, September 26th, 2006

In the intermediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the country rallied together realizing that fighting amongst ourselves would be counterproductive. Even before any investigations to determine the history of what had happened in the lead up to the attacks, it could have easily been foreseen that in the perspective of hindsight there would have been many opportunities to have thwarted the attacks. President George W. Bush’s Administration had eight short months to anticipate an attack. The Administration of President Bill Clinton had eight years. There must have been many mistakes made by both administrations.

It is likely that given a pre-9/11 perspective, if the administrations of Clinton and Bush had been reversed in sequence, 9/11 would not have been averted. The Clinton Administration considered the threat of terrorism a criminal enforcement problem, not an international conflict. It is not clear that Bush would have thought differently before 9/11.

Up until now, in the interest of comity, neither president had dissipated national unity by focusing on a blame game. President Clinton broke this tacit arrangement this Sunday in an angry interview on Fox News Sunday. “They had eight months to try [to get Bin Laden]. They did not try. I tried, ” he boasted.

A dispassionate examination of the 9/11-Commission Report or Richard Clarke’s book cited by Clinton in the interview does not support the picture painted by Clinton of a directed president doing everything in his power to get Bin Laden.

It is unclear if Bill Clinton was posing faux anger in the interview to energize Democrats in anticipation of the mid-term election. William Kristol of the Weekly Standard lays out a possible Clinton strategy for such an outburst. Chris Wallace, who conducted the interview, reports that Clinton walked away angry and chewed out subordinates suggestive of authentic anger. Perhaps, Clinton was still smarting from the docu-drama The Path to 9/11 that painted the Clinton Administration in a negative light.

As usual Clinton played a little fast and loose with the truth, but not any more than we have come to expect from Clinton spin. There was no “comprehensive anti-terror strategy” bequeathed to the Bush Administration as he asserted. Richard Clarke, Clinton’s source of all wisdom, claimed that, “There was no plan on al Qaeda that was passed from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration…[a] plan, strategy — there was no, nothing new.” In fact in 2001, Clarke said, the Bush Administration “changed the [Clinton] strategy from one of rollback [of] al Qaeda over five years to a new strategy that called for the rapid elimination of al Qaeda. That is in fact the timeline.”

Clinton may get angry from many causes, but it is true that when he is caught red-handed, a la the Monica Lewinsky affair, he has a tendency to get livid and self righteous. Perhaps it is my Conservative ear but I heard a little of the finger-wagging “I never sex with that woman” as he leaned over and harangued at Wallace, “What did I do? What did I do? I worked hard to try to kill him [Osama bin Laden]…”

It is common to be most stung by criticism when it hits close to home. Perhaps Clinton feels a little guilty that not enough was done to pursue Osama Bin Laden during his administration. The case can be made that it would have been difficult for anyone to do more, though there is always room for critical self-examination. However, in his congenitally narcissistic manner Clinton believes this is a question about him and his legacy. It is more important for the country to eschew self-blame and focus moral liability on terrorists, but Clinton insists on polishing his own reputation. It is ironic that Clinton’s outburst in desperate service of his legacy will continue to cement the vision of Clinton as an unserious person.

Presidential Approval and Gasoline Prices

Saturday, September 16th, 2006

The ubiquity of computers and data available on-line have made it possible for statistically savvy non-politicians to engage in numerical political science. Recently, “Professor Pollkatz” has drawn well-deserved attention to the relationship between Bush’s presidential approval rating and gasoline prices. As gasoline prices rise, President Bush’s job approval rating decreases. As the prices fall, Bush’s approval rises. Of course, the mere fact that there is a correlation between the two does not prove a casual link. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to suppose that gasoline prices affect the popular perception of how the economy is fairing and consequently the approval of the president. If gasoline prices are high, people are reminded weekly at the gas pump.

This relationship takes on contemporary importance since gasoline prices are currently falling. If the relationship holds, Bush’s approval should rise and perhaps affect the prospects for Republicans in the mid-term elections about a month-and-half away. Indeed, as prices have declined there does appear to be a modest improvement in presidential approval over the last week.

To make the gas-price-presidential-approval relationship clear, Pollkatz plots a composite presidential approval index as a function of time on the same graph as the scaled reciprocal gasoline price. As the gasoline price goes up, his index goes down. This allows the presidential approval and Pollkatz’s price index to track each other on similar numerical axes. The observation that the two quantities track is quite clear, but Pollkatz does not provide (or I could not find) the actual correlation statistics at his site.

To perform my own statistical analysis, I pulled down Pollkatz’s composite approval data which he based on a combination of a number of publicly available polls. I also retrieved semi-monthly prices for regular-grade unleaded gas from the Department of Energy. Rather than plotting both presidential approval and gasoline prices as a function of time, the graph below shows a scatter plot of presidential approval as a function of gasoline price.

Gasoline vs Presidential Approval

This way of displaying the data re-enforces some intuitive notions. First, there is general relationship between gasoline prices and presidential approval. Second, there appears to be two regimes of importance. When gasoline prices are greater than about $1.75 per gallon, presidential approval is strongly correlated to gasoline prices. Once gasoline prices fall below $1.75 per gallon, gas prices become less of a concern and are less associated with presidential approval ratings.

When considering all the data for the Bush presidency, the square of the correlation coefficient relating gasoline price and presidential approval is 0.54. This implies that about 54% of the variations in presidential approval can be linearly related to the price of gasoline. However, in the next graph, we only include gasoline prices larger than $1.75 per gallon. For these higher prices, the correlation coefficient is significantly larger, about 0.76. Thus, 76% of the presidential approval can be explained by gasoline prices.

Presidential Approval v. Gasoline Prices for Prices Greater Than $1.75/gallon

What does it imply for our current situation? If we believe the linear relationship, for every 10 cent decrease in the price of gasoline, Bush’s approval percentage will increase by 1.2%. Since August 12, 2006, the price of gas has fallen nearly 50 cents. We could expect roughly a 6% improvement in presidential approval, roughly consistent Rasmussen’s daily tracking data. If gasoline prices decrease to near $2.00 per gallon, Bush’s approval could cross the 50% point, close to what it was when elected to second term.

It is unclear how much gasoline prices will drop in the near future or even if they will turn around and increase. It is also unclear whether any improvement in Bush’s approval rating will measurably improve prospects for Congressional Republicans. It is clear that from the perspective of an incumbent, falling gasoline prices are preferable to rising gasoline prices.

Minimum Wage Debate

Wednesday, August 2nd, 2006

It is not uncommon for ideologies to adhere to articles of faith long refuted by the evidence. The goal of increasing the minimum wage is one such reflexive Liberal policy position that keeps finding its way into the political debate despite its intellectual vacuousness. It can only be sustained by the deliberate exploitation of the worst in populist sentiments for short-term political gain. Liberals employ rhetoric about mandating a “living wage” knowing that most earning the minimum wage do not remain at the minimum very long, and are many times the second and third workers in a household.

At best, minimum wage laws will have little effect on employment, when the government-mandated minimum wage is lower than the prevailing market minimum wage. However, under such circumstances there is little potential benefit to low-age workers in raising the minimum wage because they are already being paid more than that.

On the other hand, if the government-mandated minimum wage rises above the market wage, people whose work does not justify the minimum wage will inevitably loose their jobs. It is not so much, to use the common metaphor, that the bottom rung of the economic latter is knocked out, but it is at least raised out the reach of some. This negative consequence falls most heavily on the least-skilled workers.

Even when higher minimum wages do not immediately decrease employment, they may have other negative long term consequences. Studies suggest that higher minimum wages can lure teenagers prematurely into the labor market, decreasing their education attainment and long-term wage prospects.

Serious liberals really understand these economic effects, though a few are in perpetual denial. Their motivation for pursuing an increase in the minimum wage is far different. For the Left, disparity of incomes, what they would label as “fairness,” is the key issue. High-income workers should not be making that much than low-income workers. This explains the rhetoric about how much business CEOs make in public arguments about the minimum wage. The amount earned by CEOs is really orthogonal to the question about the exact level of minimum wage that might maximize benefits to low-wage workers. The Left’s argument is about a broader issue of equity, not economic benefits to low-wage workers.

Hence, it is preferable to cause unemployment to rise (presumably while allowing an increase benefits to non-workers) than to allow the lowest wage workers to accept wages lower than some abstract minimum.

At present, Democrats in Congress are trying to pass legislation to increase the minimum wage, while Republicans are trying to tie to a minimum wage increase to decreases in taxes. The latter provision is a “poison pill” for Democrats.

Congressional Republicans will probably yield to demands for a minimum wage increase, realizing that the impact would be marginal. In many places the prevailing market wages are significantly higher than any proposed increases. Moreover, individual states are considering an increase in minimum wages, further reducing the impact of any federal legislation. Voting for the minimum wage may turn out to be an easy vote with little positive or negative import. Politicians have rarely been known to avoid votes of little consequence but for which they can publicly congratulate themselves.

Laffer’s Ambiguous Curve

Sunday, July 16th, 2006

Physicist Niels Bohr once quipped that, “Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future.” Just several months ago, the prediction was that the federal budget deficit for this year would be $423 billion dollars. A surge in economic growth increased revenues so that the deficit has dropped $127 billion to $296 billion. In other words, the deficit estimate was 30% too high, which is a measure of the accuracy of the science of economic prediction. President Bush claims that his tax cuts were responsible for the increase in economic growth. The results mitigate the Democrats’ critique that tax rates are too low.

Democrats argue that federal revenues are just passing the point where they were in 2001.However, in 2001 the economy was entering a recession and the attack on September 11, 2001 added to negative economic growth. The tax cuts did not begin their impact until 2002, so the effect of the 2001 recession and September 11 on tax revenues would have occurred whether or not the tax cuts were implemented.

Whether one accepts Bush’s argument or not, the logic behind the Laffer curve, named after economist Arthur Laffer, is inexorable. At a 0% tax rate, government would receive no revenue. At a confiscatory 100% tax rate, there would be such a distinctive to engage in economic activity, that the tax revenue would also be zero. At some tax rate in between, the government maximizes its revenue.

Tax rates also affect private income. There must be some government revenue to provide for a government that can at police economic transactions. Others argue that investment in education by government also increases private income. In any case, a 0% tax rate would not maximize private income. But certainly a rate that maximizes private income would be at a tax rate lower than the rate at which government income is maximized.

Indeed, the two functions can be coupled so that at some intermediate tax rate, the sum of private and government income is maximized. Whether a people select a tax rate that maximizes private income, government income, or the sum of the two is in part at matter of philosophy. Indeed, there are some on the Left who would raise income taxes on the wealthy in a punitive effort to reduce income disparity; even it meant that net tax revenues would be lower.

In addition, the optimum tax rate also depends on the economic distribution of the tax. The poor who are barely managing will continue to work quite hard in spite of high tax rates because they do not have the luxury of living on less. The rich, on the other hand, could decide to eschew the additional work or risk required to earn more income at lower rates of return. Changes in the rate of capital gains also affect the economy in a different way than the taxes on regular income.

The disappointing part is that politicians do not argue about what the optimum tax rate is. For Republicans, the tax rates are always too high. For Democrats, taxes are always too low. When President Ronald Reagan followed President Jimmy Carter into office in 1980, the highest marginal income tax rates were 70%. Reagan persuaded Congress to reduce the highest marginal rate to 28%. When President George Bush followed President Clinton, the highest marginal rates were in 39.5%. The Bush tax plan reduced the highest rate to 35%. Surely, the simulative effect of the Reagan tax cut would have been substantially larger than that associated with Bush’s tax cut. Is the tax rate that maximized federal income 28%, 35%, 39.5%, or 70%? Are we close to revenue maximizing rate now? At what rates are private income or the sum of private and public income maximized? What is the optimum mix of income, sales, and other taxes? These real questions are lost in the political noise.

Utopia

Sunday, June 18th, 2006

In an exodus from persecution in Illinois, Brigham Young, led a vanguard group of Mormons through the Great Plains of the central United States to the Great Salt Lake Valley. After an arduous journey and gazing down upon the area, Young proclaimed, “Here is the place where my people Israel shall pitch their tents.” Young saw a place where his people and their descendents could prosper. We leave it to present day Utah residents and Mormon adherents to decide whether a “promised land” was reached.In a more literal sense, the Great Salt Lake Valley is the home of a new high-tech UTOPIA (Utah Telecommunication Open Infrastructure Agency). Rather than a land flowing with milk and honey, this is a land flowing with data and information. This bandwidth promises to ease commercial transactions and enable the electronic delivery of content and services to individual homes. As we gaze upon this new world, we might paraphrase Young, “Here is the place where my people shall be connected.”UTOPIA is a publicly-chartered and owned institution that controls the network that connects a number of cities in the Great Salt Lake Valley. The agency is installing an optical fiber network promising 100 Mbits/second residential and commercial bandwidth. This bandwidth is more than an order-of-magnitude faster than conventional high-speed cable or other residential optical networks offered by companies like Verizon. It is sufficient to pipe down high-definition video with additional bandwidth available for growth.However, UTOPIA only provides the digital pipes, not any content or services. The idea is that the physical network is a natural monopoly like electricity or water services and ought to be a regulated monopoly. Once this pipe is in place, the assumption is that there will competition to provide services like phone connection, Internet connections, and video programming driving down prices.

There are many communities where a cable company will come in an drop coax cable to every home while a telecommunications company will follow, perhaps years later, and drop optical fiber to the same houses. There is duplication of effort which, on the face of it, appears to be an inefficiency. Moreover, service providers are limited to those companies with the economic resources to build a full-scale network. Competition for services is either non-existent or fought out between only a few large companies. Prices tend to stay high. The UTOPIA plan tries to circumvent this by treating bandwidth itself a public utility.

UTOPIA is an interesting and novel concept. Municipalities and states ought to track the progress of this model for providing bandwidth. The potential downside is that public utilities tend to be lethargic and avoid innovation. If UTOPIA had been conceived a decade ago, they might have decided to lay copper instead of optical fiber. Once this investment is made, would a UTOPIA be eager to replace this infrastructure? The inefficiency of two companies laying two types of lines may be part of what is termed “creative destruction” where innovative economic transformations are built on the ruins of previously successful enterprises.

Other municipalities may adopt similar or hybrid models to deliver bandwidth. Overtime we may see what mix of government-regulated monopoly, private enterprise, and technological progress will create the freest possible environment for innovation and growth in residential and commercial bandwidth.