The isolation of two large oceans makes most Americans happily immune to a preoccupation with foreign affairs. We expect everyone to be like us, content to raise our families and indulge in commercial pursuits. We simply do not pay very much attention to foreign affairs, even affairs that may be crucial to our well-being. For most Americans, Iraq and Saddam Hussein are issues that concerned us ten years ago, when the US and its allies liberated Kuwait from the Iraqis. Most troops returned home to cheers and parades. Events in the region during the post-Gulf War period made the news, but were largely ignored. Nonetheless, the Gulf War and its aftermath do provide some illuminating insight into the American political landscape.
In the run up to the Gulf War, the Vietnam-era, Democratic anti-war movement had moved into full gear. Extrapolating from the Vietnam experience, there were dire predictions of a quagmire in the desert and massive American casualties. Congress very reluctantly approved military action. A majority of Democrats (including the current Democratic Senate Leader Tom Daschle) and all of the Democratic leadership refuse to endorse military action. The Democrats were deeply and viscerally opposed to any military action and were convinced that sanctions should be used to remove the Iraqis from Kuwait. If that counsel had been followed, Kuwait would now be a province of Iraq.
Despite the military success of the Gulf War, George Bush (41) was not re-elected. Americans once again proved that economic problems trump success abroad. Bill Clinton was elected in 1992, as a “New Democrat” driven less by ideology and more by practicality. Bill Clinton embraced this “practicality” in helping to implement the arms inspection regime to insure that Saddam Hussein was ridding himself of weapons of mass destruction.
For a few years, we believed we were largely successful. It was not until an Iraqi defected that we appreciated the full extent of Iraqi’s program for obtaining weapons of mass destruction. The inspections were a key element in the agreement that suspended hostilities. In the ensuing years, the arms inspectors played a cat and mouse game with the Iraqis. The Iraqis delayed and stalled to prevent a full and complete inspections regime.
By February 1998, Clinton was convinced that Iraqi intransigence implied they were seeking weapons of mass destruction and would use them. In a call for action, Clinton argued that Hussein’s “regime threatens the safety of his people, the stability of his region, and the security of all the rest of us. Some day, some way, I guarantee you, he’ll use the arsenal. Let there be no doubt, we are prepared to act. I know the people we may call upon in uniform are ready. The American people have to be ready as well.”
Unlike the call for action by George Bush (41), this call was welcomed by the Democratic leadership, including Tom Daschle, who co-sponsored Senate Concurrent Resolution 71. The resolution authorized the president to “take all necessary and appropriate actions to respond to the threat posed by Iraq’s refusal to end it’s weapons of mass destruction programs.”
Why were some Democrats so reluctant to authorize the use of force by the first President Bush against Iraq, eager to so empower President Clinton, and again squeamish about support for the second President Bush. Some Republican and Conservative critics argue that Democrats have no real position and are just playing politics with national defense issues. That explanation is far too simplistic.
Despite the grant of military authority to Clinton by many Democrats, others in the party were far less sanguine about permitting open-ended discretion. Senator Richard Durbin (D) of Illinois confessed that the broad language of the resolution made him uneasy. Senator Max Cleland (D) of Georgia drew a close analogy with Vietnam, explaining that “there shouldn’t be a rush to judgment…as there was with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.” While embracing the idea of broad executive authority in domestic affairs, with some exceptions, the core of the Democratic Party is disinclined to grant such authority to a president and is deeply and habitually distrustful of anything military.
Daschle and other Democrats did not really abandon their scruples about US military intervention. The reason that Daschle and others were so willing to grant Clinton military authority and are parsimonious about such grants to both George Bushs is that they fully understand the consequences of such grants. They know that both Bushs were likely to fully employ and exploit such authority. On the other hand, they understood that Clinton would be unwilling to expend much political capital in going after Saddam Hussein with the full military force necessary.
President Clinton would say the right words about Hussein’s regime and warn about the dangers of weapons of mass destruction. Clinton’s Secretary of Defense, Richard Cohen, would emphasize that continued Iraqi intransigence would put “Security Council credibility on the line [and]…US credibility as well.” However, in the end, he would not be willing to commit the necessary forces to disarm Hussein’s dangerous regime. Passage of Senate Concurrent Resolution 71 was essentially a no-cost action by Democrats that would provide political cover for their antipathy towards the use of military power.
They were right. By October 1998, Iraq ended all cooperation with arms inspectors. Despite the United Nations resolutions, there would be no more inspections in Iraq for weapons of mass destruction. In December 1998, coalition forces launched four days of air strikes, no doubt doing significant damage to Iraqi capabilities. However, after thrashing about for four days, the assault ended. Iraq had successfully remove arms inspectors and were now free to pursue plans for biological, chemical, and nuclear capabilities, while Americans and British provided only a token response. For Iraq, the strategy has worked for at least four years.
D’Souza on Freedom and Virtue
Sunday, September 8th, 2002The observation is trite, but nonetheless true. It often takes an outsider to appreciate the value of the happy circumstances and good fortune we all too often take for granted. Dinesh D’Souza is one such person.
D’Souza grew up in a middle class family in India. When he was seventeen, he managed to attend a high school in Arizona as a foreign exchange student. He was so taken with the US that he enrolled in Dartmouth College in 1979, where he majored in English. Once there, he help found the Dartmouth Review, a Conservative gadfly publication that ultimately found itself embroiled in campus controversies. After graduation, he wrote for a number of Conservative publications and by 1986, he was on the White House staff for President Ronald Reagan. It was a remarkably far trip from India to the White House taken in a remarkably short time.
Recently, the University of California at Berkeley came under criticism when students decided to issue white, rather than red, white, and blue ribbons in remembrance of the attacks of September 11. Ostensibly, red, white, and blue ribbons would be exclusionary. Fortunately, adults intervened and red, white, and blue ribbons will also be issued.
D’Souza recognized the silliness and meanness of political correctness on campuses earlier than most. He became a conspicuous personality when he wrote Illiberal Education: Political Correctness and the College Experience in 1992. There is no quicker way to be embraced by Conservatives and reviled by Liberals than to poke fun at the pretentious and closed-minded political correctness on college campus.
Even the title of D’Souza’s new book, What’s So Great About America, causes irritation among some who question that there is anything of America worthy of emulation. D’Souza systemically plows through the conventional criticisms of America. While acknowledging that the US, like all human institutions is imperfect, over the last 200 years, the government and culture has proved to be self-correcting. One and a half centuries ago, it fought a bloody civil war to rid itself of slavery and forty years ago it largely rid itself of government sanctioned racial discrimination. In the last century, it also managed to play a pivotal role in defeating Nazism and in the collapse of Soviet Communism.
D’Souza has been most loudly criticized for his treatment of slavery, largely because he has drawn from his own ethnic roots. D’Souza explains how his grandfather retains a strong animosity for white people, particularly the British. No doubt this feeling is explained by the arrogant and racist treatment his grandfather received at the hands of the British.
D’Souza recognizes the reasonableness and rationality of this attitude. However, he also acknowledges that democracy and respect for individuality introduced by the British radically increases the personal opportunities for him.
By analogy, D’Souza argues that American slavery was an immoral, brutal, and cruel institution, but two hundred years later the descendants of the slaves that suffered so much are economically better off and politically freer than most of their counterparts in Africa. D’Souza has been unfairly criticized as an apologist for slavery.
The rancor surrounding this discussion, unfortunately, has clouded the real thesis of his book. His argument is far more important, subtle, and directed at the critique of America and the West in general by fundamentalists in the Islamic World. There is no real dispute that countries that have adopted tolerant and commercial societies that respect individual rights have been more materially successful. The wealth disparity is apparent to all.
The critique is that in the process of creating wealth, Western societies have contributed to personal alienation, attenuated important family ties, and nurtured decadence and indulgence and other self-destructive behavior. The West may be free, but it is not virtuous. Islamic fundamentalists argue that Islamic government would serve the higher value of virtue, not freedom.
This argument is not trivial or unimportant. Western culture as projected in music, movies, and television can promote violence and casual promiscuity, as well as nurture an adolescent preoccupation with self-indulgence and the ethos of materialistic accumulation. You do not have to be an Islamic fundamentalist to acknowledge that respect for individual choice means enduring the consequences of many bad choices.
D’Souza’s response is that a society that tries to impose virtue by creating a theocracy does not produce virtue at all. If behavioral norms are externally imposed, rather than rise from within, they cannot truly be a sign of virtue. Virtue must be freely selected. It is only by allowing the freedom to be evil, that there can be virtue. D’Souza’s argument echoes the words of John Locke who aptly pointed out, “Neither the profession of any articles of faith, nor the conformity to any outward form of worship … can be available to the salvation of souls, unless the truth of the one and the acceptableness of the other unto God be thoroughly believed by those that so profess and practice.”
The response of the West and D’Souza is that the choice is not between freedom and virtue. Rather, one cannot have virtue, without respect for individual freedom. The most important thing that the state can do to encourage virtue is to provide for freedom. Thus, D’Souza reminds us of something we should have remembered all along.
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