“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution.
In the notorious 1896 decision by the US Supreme Court, Plessy v. Ferguson, the Court ruled that state-mandated disparate treatment by race did not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In a desperate and convoluted effort to accommodate the social views of the time, the Court ignored the plain meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and decided that Louisiana could pass a law requiring: “equal but separate accommodations for the white, and colored, races” on railway cars. On the lonely side of the 8-1 decision, Justice Marshall Harlan dissented:
“Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved.”
In Brown v. Topeka Board of Education in 1954, the Court reversed itself, establishing the principle that government decisions could not be raced based. In his brief before the Supreme Court in Brown, the future Justice Thurgood Marshall powerfully argued that “Distinctions by race are so evil, so arbitrary and invidious that a state, bound to defend the equal protection of the laws must not invoke them in any public sphere.”
The Supreme Court recently ruled on the application of racial preferences for school admissions. In the case of Gratz v. Bollinger et al. regarding the University of Michigan’s undergraduate admissions process, the Court ruled that a rigid point system that gave significant and automatic advantage based on race was unconstitutional. In a second case having to do with University of Michigan Law School admissions, Grutter v. Bollinger et al., the Court permitted racial preferences if the admissions decisions were not rigidly linked to race. This second case allowed for the application of racial distinctions to achieve a critical mass of certain racial populations so long as race was considered in a holistic view of the entire individual. The logic of the two decisions seems to be at war with one another. How can one achieve the so-called advantage of maintaining a critical mass of minority students, without adjusting the weighting in admissions criteria, however applied, to yield a given fraction of minority students?
There is a reason that affirmative action activists have almost unanimously viewed the split decisions as a victory. Since the Court now permits racial preferences to achieve diversity, advocates are confident that they can always obscure and befuddle the details of the admissions process so that potential litigants will have difficulty proving that any rigid racial preferences applied.
Let us be clear, proponents of racial preferences will find surreptitious means to systemically apply their racial criteria in the admissions process. If the nod were given to a minority students in admissions in the rare instances where the qualifications of two candidates for admissions were indistinguishable, opponents of racial preferences would not be so offended by their application and proponents would not view such preferences as so crucial in achieving their preferred mean hue of the student population.
However, in making the ruling the Court has done grave injustice to the principle of strict scrutiny when applied to circumscription of individual constitutional rites. In modern jurisprudence, the Court has applied a “strict scrutiny” to any state-sponsored distinctions based on race. To pass constitutional muster, such racial distinctions must meet a high standard of “compelling state interest.” As Justice Clarence Thomas pointed out in his dissent to Grutter v. Bollinger et al., the Court had only permitted state-sponsored racial distinctions in two classes of situations.
The first is the case of national security. The Court ruled that the state interest in restricting Japanese-Americans during World War II was sufficiently compelling to be permitted notwithstanding the protections the Fourteenth Amendment. In retrospect, it is clear that the internment of Japanese-Americans was borne more out of racial prejudice than legitimate security issues, providing additional evidence of the sorry observation in our history that it is far too easy to misapply racial distinctions.
The second category where the Court has permitted the use of racial distinction is for direct and narrow remediation of racial discrimination by an institution that has discriminated in the past. No such claim was made in the University of Michigan cases.
Elevation of the vague notion of “diversity” (of skin color but certainly not of perspective) to a compelling state interest undermines the bulwarks of the Fourteenth Amendment and other constitutional protections so that they might more easily be washed over by an unconstrained flood of government action. The jurisprudence of the Court, if logically applied, might permit racial profiling or broader search powers to address the compelling state interest of law enforcement. Thomas asks, if the Court is willing to grant deference to a school to use race-based admissions to achieve diversity, would historically black colleges be permitted to use race-based admissions to maintain the homogeneity?
Ultimately, the case can be made that race-based preferences do more to harm their potential beneficiaries by stigmatizing true excellence and achievement. However, like Plessy v.Ferguson, the recent decision to allow violations of the Fourteenth Amendment in government-sponsored school admissions will ultimately come to be viewed as a sad aberration and pathetic pandering to the conventional wisdom of the politically influential. There also remains the growing practical problem of applying racial distinctions to a population diligently, happily, and rapidly blurring those artificial categories by marriage. One can only hope that, as suggested by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the case for race-based preferences ought to disappear in 25 years. Unfortunately, there are too many people with a vested interest in maintaining the status quo for such preferences to slowly whither.
In the opening of his dissent, Justice Thomas, who has suffered the stigma of being treated different because of his race by both the mean-spirited and those with noble aspirations reminded us the words of the abolitionist and former slave Frederick Douglass:
“What I ask for the negro is not benevolence, not pity, not sympathy, but simply justice. The American people have always been anxious to know what they shall do with us… I have had but one answer from the beginning. Do nothing with us! Your doing with us has already played the mischief with us. Do nothing with us! If the apples will not remain on the tree of their own strength, if they are worm-eaten at the core, if they are early ripe and disposed to fall, let them fall! … And if the negro cannot stand on his own legs, let him fall also. All I ask is, give him a chance to stand on his own legs! Let him alone! …[Y]our interference is doing him positive injury.”
Once again, Douglass has proven prophetic.
Moneyball
Sunday, July 6th, 2003According to classical economic theory, mature markets at equilibrium should reach a point of optimum efficiency. After a sufficient time, Adam Smith’s invisible hand ought to have slapped the inefficiencies out of any market. Surely, we could be so bold as to presume to apply such reasoning to professional baseball. Baseball is nothing, if not competitive; each side continually seeking out even the most meager of advantages. Do we have little more to learn about the stratagems of baseball? Do the myriad of conventional baseball statistics adequately and accurately quantify the contributions of players?
People have clutched on to various approaches to the game, but since the 1970’s Kansas native Bill James has made it a point to apply statistical analysis to assess the effectiveness of common baseball strategies. One of Bill James’s first heresies was the discovery that attempting base stealing rarely contributed to run scoring unless it was successful more than 70% of the time. Bill James is the founder of sabermetrics, “the search for objective knowledge about baseball.” (The term derives from an abbreviation for the name of the group that followed in James’s footsteps, the Society for American Baseball Research.)
James and others who have adopted his philosophy of critically applying statistics to baseball have developed radically different measures of player performance. For example, players have traditionally been evaluated on the basis of batting average, the number of hits divided by the number of at bats. Batting average is the dominant hitting statistic published in daily papers. Runs are the currency of baseball and sabermetricians have found other parameters that are far more correlated to a player’s contribution to runs scored. Getting on base, on base percentage, even by drawing a boring walk, is critically important. Indeed, the sum of on-base-percentage and slugging average (OPS)1 is far more highly correlated to the runs a team scores than is batting average. Hence, in seeking to evaluate baseball talent, in choosing young players to draft and nurture and others to trade for, OPS and other more exotic statistical measures like “runs created,” represent better criteria than simple batting average.
However, baseball ownership and management are conservative by temperament and generally grossly uneducated in statistics. James’s observations and the work of other sabermetricians were generally viewed as the oddball conclusions of baseball player wannabees, four-eyed, shallow-chested nerds who baseball players used to pick on in grade school. Sabermetricians might conjure up a clever insight now and then, but they really could not contribute to baseball strategy in any meaningful way. However, money has a way of shaking things up and big money shakes thinks up vigorously.
The growing ubiquity of computational capability has made the application of statistics to baseball easier. However, if the importance of statistical ways of looking at baseball players had been universally accepted, computing power would have been found. The real jolt into baseball has been a consequence of the high cost of baseball talent. In 1967, the average salary of a baseball player was $19,000 per year. It grew to $144,000 by 1980, $598,000 by 1990, and $1,900,000 by 2000. Even adjusted for inflation, this represents tremendous growth. Moreover, there is a 6-to-1 ratio in the payrolls of the wealthiest and poorest team. These facts place a high premium on judging and assessing baseball talent.
Thus begins the story of Billy Beane as told by Michael Lewis in his book Moneyball: The Art of Winning in an Unfair Game. As a young man, Billy Beane was a baseball scout’s dream. He had a decent batting average, but more importantly he was big, strong, well built, and fast. He looked like a scout’s image of a baseball player.
The New York Mets persuaded him, against his better judgment, to forgo a baseball scholarship to Stanford and join the Mets organization. Beane’s playing career fizzled primarily because he was too aggressive a batter, but he learned a few important lessons. One, baseball scouts were typically old baseball players who assessed talent as much on appearance as on numerical performance. They seem to all have the dream of discovering and molding the next great baseball talent. Two, Beane began to appreciate that really good hitters seemed to have an innate patience that allowed them to draw a lot of walks and only swing a pitches they can handle. Beane also observed that it is virtually impossible to teach patience, at least by the time players reach professional baseball. Three, it is not until players have played a number of years of college baseball that the sample size of plate appearances or innings pitched is sufficiently large that players could be reliably evaluated. Beane would rarely seek a player like himself right out of high school, even he looks like a baseball player.
After a mediocre career as a player, Beane moved to the front office of the Oakland A’s eventually rising to general manager. Beane was constrained by an ownership unwilling carry a large payroll and he made a virtue of this necessity. Embracing many of the insights of sabermetricians and hiring statistically competent Ivy League graduates to develop better statistical methods of player evaluation, Bean was able to acquire players who by conventional analysis and by perhaps by appearance were undervalued.
Beane uses batting statistics to estimate likely run production and derive dollar costs per run scored. It is then possible to numerically assess whether the acquisition of a particular player will reduce or increase the team’s net cost per run scored. Like an astute investor, Billy Beane exploits the inefficiencies created by traditional baseball measures to find players whose performance would likely exceed market expectations. When a player’s performance becomes apparent after playing with the A’s, his salary demands would grow larger than the A’s could afford and Beane would trade him off for undervalued players from other teams. After the middle of the season, some high payroll teams with slim playoff hopes would be looking to shed some salary, and Oakland could pick up bargain players.
It is estimated that the difference in talent between teams amounts to about a run a game. Luck adds perhaps four runs a game. The impact of the difference in talent between the teams is overwhelmed by luck in any particular game. However, over a 162 game season luck tends to average out and talent generally shines through. Once the playoffs begin, luck tends to dominate again. There are too few games, too small a sample size, for the best team to be assured victory in any particular series.
In 2002, Oakland posted the same 103 wins as the New York Yankees, a team boasting the largest payroll in baseball. There also were teams such as the New York Mets and the Baltimore Orioles carrying large payrolls that could not manage to win half of their games. In the American League West, there was an exactly inverse correlation of player payroll and performance with the parsimonious Oakland A’s leading the division and the high-spending Texas Rangers struggling with less than a 45% winning percentage.
Despite the conspicuous low-budget success of Oakland, other baseball teams have been slow to adopt Beane’s approach. Baseball Commissioner Bud Selig has tried to equalize the resources available to teams to prevent high-spending teams from perpetual dominance. The Oakland A’s are thus an embarrassment. Of course, as sabermetrics becomes more widely adopted, the differential in payroll will become more important. However, for now most of the baseball intelligentsia continue to regard Oakland as a fluke. Such intransigent owners and managers will be left behind as a more critical analysis of baseball takes hold. Beane remains elated at the remaining stubbornness, confident it will insure the continued availability of undervalued players.
1. On base percentage is the number of times a player safely makes it to base divided by the number of plate appearances. Slugging percentage is the number of total bases divided by the number of at bats. The term “percentage” is used when “fraction” is more accurate.
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