Frank’s Case Book

Parliamentary governments are inherently more provisional than the presidential form under which the United States operates. Temporary changes in political fortunes can force elections, while presidents, save for “high crimes and misdemeanors” are permitted at least four years to attempt to implement their policies. The provisional nature of parliamentary governments is probably the reason that ministerial resignations for failures are more common under parliamentary systems. These resignations are more common even if the responsibility for failure is not directly attributable to a minister. Like the captain in command of ship, what ever happens, the minister takes responsibility.

There is, admittedly, a certain satisfaction and closure in a minister’s resignation. It conveys as sense of accountability, salutary in democratic governments. There is even statistical evidence accumulated by political scientists that suggests that the timely resignation of a minister can cauterize a political wound and even enhance the political fortunes of the minister’s party. Perhaps it is the inveterate American emphasis on individuality that makes it difficult to assign personal blame unless there are personal actions involved. Calls for resignation in the United States do not typically arise from a principled insistence upon absolute accountability, but rather from political oppurtunism. The calls for the resignation of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld fall into this latter category.

Many Democrats, who want to maximize the political damage to the Bush Administration, are the same ones who were willing to overlook far more consequential decisions by Democratic cabinet members. Two cases come immediately to mind. In 1992, Attorney General Janet Reno specifically approved the assault on the Branch Davidians cult compound in Waco, Texas. The assault did not go as planned and 75 people died. In 1993, then General Colin Powel asked Secretary of Defense Les Aspin to grant the request of the US commander in Somalia for armored vehicles. Wishing to avoid a heavy presence, Aspin denied the requests. Partially as a consequence of this decision, 18 soldiers were killed in an ambush in Mogadishu.

Neither Reno nor Aspin willed those tragic outcomes. They erred in good faith. However, they were far more directly involved in the decisions that led to the disasters than Rumsfeld is to prisoner abuse, yet few Democrats asked for Reno’s or Aspin’s resignation. Republicans, of course, did, and Democrats reflexively defended Clinton’s cabinet members.

Democrats and Republicans playing political games is expected behavior, but today when the stakes in the War on Terror are so grave, we should expect more. We know that the higher echelons in the military initiated an investigation immediately as information about prisoner abuse worked up the chain of command. Investigations apportion responsibility. However, the anxiousness by some on the Left to bring down Rumsfeld and to indirectly suggest that the US military is engaged in systemic and inherent abuse is unwise and unbecoming.

This is the opportunity, the moment of imperfection, that those who wish ill on the US have waited for. With or without finding WMD, there can be no doubt that Coalition troops liberated Iraqis from a fascist regime. By the conventional measures of availability of food, electricity, water and sewage treatment, and the less conventional measure of freedom, Iraqis, as a whole, are far better off than they were a year ago. Security, of course, remains a primary concern. However, if the ethical distinction between Americans and Saddam’s regime can be blurred, the morality of American actions can be called into question. That is why in the Middle East, there has been far more press coverage of the abuses at Abu Ghraib than of the slashing of the throat of an American civilian by terrorists. The juxtaposition of American abuses coupled with the apology of American leaders stands in stark moral contrast to the actions of terrorists we fight, evil bullies who brag at the opportunity to slit American throats.

No one is suggesting that investigations into prisoner abuse should not proceed with due diligence or that there should be no press coverage. Nonetheless, an excessive and disproportionate focus on the prisoner abuse by the loyal opposition and saturation press coverage does not bring us closer to the truth. Indeed, it can distort truthful context in a way that may endanger American and Iraqi lives. The honest application of justice remains the only way to salvage American honor from the dishonor the Abu Ghraib prison. If the abuse at Abu Ghraib looks so bad, it is because Americans aspire to higher standards.

Dear Abby,Perhaps I am self-delusional, but I judge myself to be a reasonably intelligent and well-informed person. Yet, I am having difficulty resolving seemingly irreconcilable ideas. How could evidence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) be so compelling before the war, yet one year later after the liberation of Iraq WMD stockpiles have not been found? I am reduced to asking for help from an adice columnist.

It is clear that virtually every intelligence organization in the world prior to the war concluded that the Iraqi regime possessed WMD of one sort or the other. The US did. The British did. The French did. The Germans did. The Russians did. Even the United Nations Security Council collectively concluded that Iraq had not complied with its obligations to rid itself of WMD and related programs. Iraq had even acknowledged possession of significant quantities of anthrax and other agents and could or would never provide proof of their destruction. Moreover, if Saddam would have simply provided evidence that the regime had rid itself of WMD, then he would have had access to billions of dollars of additional oil revenue. If he had demonstrably renounced WMD and consequently allowed the world to withdraw economic sanctions, he could have waited a decent interval and re-started his WMD program. Abby, help me with my dilemma: stockpiles of WMD have not been found, yet if Saddam had no WMD program why did he endure economic sanctions for a decade?

Though post-war inspections teams have found evidence of WMD laboratories and evidence of long range missile systems in violation of the Gulf War cease fire, but they have not yet found anticipated stockpiles of WMD.

Abby, there are some possible explanations. Perhaps with your help the apparent inconsistencies with these explanations can be resolved.

The WMD Were Hidden or Transferred: Given the several month run-up to liberation by Coalition forces, Saddam’s regime certainly had sufficient time to effectively hide his WMD or transfer stockpiles to Syria or elsewhere. It is very easy to hide the small volume required for militarily significant amounts of WMD, so perhaps there are still dangerous stockpiles that have not been located. Saddam’s regime has been known to bury entire planes to keep them from the prying eyes of Western surveillance. Yet, one would imagine that the inspections teams by now would have been able to persuade at least some of Saddam’s weapons experts to indicate where such WMD might be hidden.

The transfer of WMD to Syria is problematic as well. Saddam would not be anxious to supply WMD to Syria and thereby increase the relative power of a neighbor and competitor. Nonetheless, there is precedent for this behavior. Before Gulf War I in 1991, Saddam sent many of his fighter aircraft to Iran, a former mortal enemy, rather than have his entire air force destroyed by the Americans. Not surprisingly, Iran never returned the aircraft.

Iraqi WMD Were Destroyed Long Ago: Is it possible that Saddam long ago destroyed his WMD stockpiles, but was unwilling to admit it for fear that he would be vulnerable to attack from his regional enemies or from the United States? However, this explanation is also unpersuasive. If Saddam was so fearful of his enemies, relying on a deception about possession of WMD would be a precarious arrangement. If these enemies came to realize that Saddam had no WMD, the deterrence and respect they provided would immediately evaporate. Why risk the possibility of enemies discovering that his WMD cupboards were bare? It would be more in Saddam’s self-interest to keep WMD stockpiles while constantly thwarting international inspections in the hope that the international community would weary of the hunt and eventually drop economic sanctions altogether. Then Saddam would have WMD, without the cost of sanctions.

Saddam Was Fooled: A third scenario is that the world’s intelligence agencies were so convinced that Saddam’s regime possessed WMD because Saddam was erroneously convinced he did. Perhaps Saddam’s weapons engineers were truly unable to stockpile WMD under the watchful gaze of weapons inspectors or were too slow in WMD development. Rather than face the anger of a frustrated Saddam, these engineers tricked Saddam into believing that Iraq had WMD. How would Saddam know whether a particular barrel was filled with a chemical agent or with water?

However, this explanation also has its weaknesses. As much as the inability to construct WMD might raise the lethal ire of Saddam, being caught lying to Saddam would probably pose an even greater peril. Surely, someone would have found it to their temporary political advantage to inform upon others who were deceiving Saddam about WMD.

Should not additional information have cleared issues up one year later? Abby, how is it that some potentially revealing interesting developments have not received attention or reasonable scrutiny in the popular press?

Early this year, routine screening found a barrel containing several pounds of “yellow cake,” uranium oxide, in a shipment of junk metal from Jordon to Rotterdam. Uranium oxide can be refined into enriched uranium, a potential fuel for a nuclear weapon. The presence of the yellow cake was confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency. An investigation found that the Jordanian junk dealer was acting in good faith and that the likely source of the material was Iraq. Uranium oxide is not found naturally in barrels. Someone in the Middle East region, Jordan, Syria, or Iraq was the source of material and the matter is directly relevant to determining which of the above three scenarios is the most likely. Abby, am I missing something, or is this an important clue here?

This last month, Jordan claims to have thwarted an attack by Al Qaeda that would have used chemical agents, potentially killing tens of thousands. Now the Jordanian government is not particularly reliable, but there seems to be very little reason for it to create this incident. Abby, should not evidence that Al Qaeda operatives, in the geographic vicinity of Syria and Iraq, have chemical weapon capability be the subject of intense scrutiny and interest?

Perhaps it is difficult for news organizations to untangle the circuitous route of nuclear material or uproot Al Qaeda plots in Jordan, but they should at least by apply pressure to authorities to track down clues to the disposition of Iraqi WMD. Why are these cases not leading the evening news? If they have been debunked, let’s hear the evidence? Silence is not sufficient. Abby, can you help me understand?

— Still Confused

Human institutions are by nature flawed because they are composed of imperfect human beings. Although talented and honest people are necessary for the long-term success of any institution, internal checks and balances are also essential. Lately, it has become apparent that the United Nations is not populated with a sufficient number of people of character and integrity and the honest ones that remain are not buttressed by sufficient institutional mechanisms to protect them.

When called upon to administer the Oil-for-Food Program, the UN not only allowed former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein to skim money off the top — money intended to provide food and medical supplies to Iraqi children — but skimmed some of it off for themselves. Not managing to keep Hussein from surreptitiously stealing from his own people may be slightly mitigated as amazingly negligent incompetence. Participating in the theft represents corruption of the highest order.

It all started in the aftermath of the first Gulf War. Hussein was required to make a full accounting of the destruction of his weapons of mass destruction as well as forgo his aid to foreign terrorist organizations. The international community concluded that the Iraqi regime had not complied with the terms of the armistice. As a way to apply pressure to the regime, most trade with Iraq was prohibited. Although some humanitarian aid was permitted, the Iraqi regime and human rights organizations complained that though the sanctions were aimed at Hussein, the children of

To alleviate the problem, the United Nations started the Oil-for-Food Program. Iraq would be permitted to sell portions of its oil in exchange for food and other humanitarian supplies. Administering such a large program is admittedly difficult, but it is something for which the UN ought to exhibit particular competence. If it can not manage to do this, it is hard to understand what else they could be good at. Inexplicably, the UN permitted Iraq to pick both the companies it sold oil to and the companies from which it would purchase supplies. Hence, Hussein was able to skim money off both ends.

It worked this way. Iraq would sell oil at below market rates to companies it selected. After the re-sale of the oil, these companies would then kickback funds directly to the Iraqi government. Similarly, the Iraqi government would purchase food and supplies at above market rates from hand-picked companies and would later receive a kick back. As a consequence, the General Accounting Office reports that the Iraqi regime skimmed at least $10 billion intended for Iraqi children. All this was happening while the UN’s Food and Agricultural Organization as well as the UN Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) reported that 200 children were dying everyday (more than 5000 per month) due to sanctions.

Investigative reporting by the Wall StreetJournal and Commentary Magazine has documented that one of the beneficiaries of skimmed money was Benon Sevan, the UN Executive Director of the Oil-for-Food Program. In the first year of the program, most of the transactions were open, but after Sevan took over a veil of secrecy was drawn over the program for “proprietary” reasons. It has been reported that Iraq was using a Panamanian firm to send money directly to Sevan. Moreover, a Swiss-based firm, Cotecna Inspections, with ties to Kojo Annan, son of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, was in charge of inspecting shipments bound for Iraq. There were no declarations or even considerations of an apparent conflict of interest. Among items that were approved for humanitarian aid by the company were a Mercedes Benz and equipment for the Iraqi Departments of Justice and Information.

Other evidence indicates that much of the Oil-for-Food funding was routed through the French bank now known as BNP Paribas and that French and Russian firms were favorite choices of Hussein for below market price oil sales. Conclusive evidence is still out on the French and the Russians. However, the fact that the French and the Russians were both benefactors of Iraqi largesse and the French and Russians made sure the Security Council would never endorse the use of force against Iraq deserves greater scrutiny. If it turns out that the French and Germans acted in the Security Council for largely pecuniary purposes, it would damage the prestige and moral authority, such as it is, of French and Russian and the UN. It is hard to argue that the UN is an honest broker when it is taking payoffs on the side.

Embarrassed by the scandal, Kofi Annan now has asked Paul Volcker, former Chairman of the US Federal Reserve, to lead an investigation. However, it is not clear where all the records are and if Volcker will be able to come to some definitive conclusions about the scandal.

The Bush Administration is trying to broaden the international participation in the reconstruction of by enlisting the UN to help in the transition to Iraqi authority. While this is probably a wise move, we should be careful of what we wish for. We may get it.

Wars have their turning points. In the American Revolutionary War, well-disciplined Americans under the leadership of General Horatio Gates at Saratoga forced British General John Burgoyne to give up his attempt to physically split the young United States by marching south from Canada. The victory convinced the French that the colonies had a credible chance to win their independence from Britain. Subsequent military support from the French was crucial in the American victory.

In the American Civil War, it seemed that General Robert E. Lee’s perpetual successes would insure that Union forces would never be able to decisively defeat the Confederate States. Emboldened by his victory at Chancellorsville, Virginia in May 1863, Lee believed that by striking deeply into Union territory he could sap the will of the Union and sue for some sort of peace. Fortunately for the Union, Lee met surprisingly strong resistance from troops led by General George G. Meade at Gettysburg. Lee was forced to withdraw and the ultimate outcome of the Civil War never seemed in doubt afterwards.

During the Vietnam War, the surprising attacks by the Viet Cong during the Tet Offensive in 1968 convinced many, at least the American elites, that victory by the North was inevitable. The ironic part was that in Vietnam, the American response to the Tet Offensive was heartening to the South Vietnamese. The North took its best shot and was decisively repelled. However, the perception of victory or defeat appears to be at least as important as the actual facts.

Up until February, it appeared that perhaps Iraq was settling into a level of normalcy. Economic activity is exploding, unemployment is plummeting, children are attending school, and oil production has surpassed pre-war levels. The number of Coalition casualties was dwindling. February experienced the lowest level of Coalition casualties since liberation.

Somewhere in March, the level of violence exploded, symbolized by the gruesome burning and display of American contractors by Islamo-fascists in Fallujah. Fallujah is a stronghold of Sunni Muslims who profited under the despotic rule of Saddam Hussein. Loyalists to the former regime were never routed out of Fallujah during the initial hostilities. Baghdad fell before Coalition troops reached Fallujah and the Saddam Hussein loyalists faded into the populace rather than fight. Undeterred, they are now trying to disrupt the transfer of power to Iraqi authorities. A free Iraq ruled democratically would certainly diminish their position. Indeed, captured documents reveal Sunni intentions to attack the majority Shite population. Those that seize hostages and directly target civilians for violence conspicuously reveal their minute moral stature.

In order for the fledging Iraqi democracy to take root, ordinary Iraqis must be convinced that they will not be abandoned by the Americans until security is established and a stable Iraqi government assumes full authority over the country. Those who are certain that they could not achieve political leadership through a democratic process have no choice but to use violence and intimidation. Make no mistake about it, almost by definition, the forces for disruption in Iraq are anti-democratic and anti-freedom.

The current chaos in Iraq represents both a crisis and an opportunity. If Americans can find a way to maintain security while moving Iraq toward political normalcy, a turning point will have occurred in Iraq. It is, of course, always possible that a victory in Iraq will not be portrayed as such in the media. Fascist insurgents realize they cannot win a military victory and they seek to secure the important propaganda one.

There is probably no single person in the decade before the September 11, 2001 attacks who labored more passionately than Richard Clarke to convince US political leadership of the dangers posed by bin Laden and Al Qaeda. Clarke began his career in the Federal Government’s Senior Executive Service in 1973 under Richard Nixon and has served the presidents in between in various capacities. During the Clinton Administration, Clarke served as chairman of the National Security Group, which coordinates the anti-terrorist activities of the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice. Ironically, Clarke was so persistently focused on Al Qaeda that he may have undercut his own credibility. Government officials familiar with Clarke were not sure whether he possessed the single mindedness of a genius or a nut.

It is easy to appreciate the reluctance of political leaders to act on Clarke’s recommendations. Undercutting Al Qaeda would require military action in Afghanistan, literally American boots on the ground. Until September 11, it was much easier, and perhaps more prudent, to believe that the terrorist threat from Al Qaeda could be managed by more aggressive intelligence gathering and law enforcement. It is hard to imagine any president would be so concerned about Al Qaeda prior to September 11 that he would have led the country into a difficult foreign war probably without allies.

By the mid-1990s, Clarke believed the Al Qaeda threat was sufficiently grave to justify the capture or killing of bin Laden. A similar consensus did not exist in the Clinton Administration. For example, despite zealous arguments from Clarke, the US did not accept Sudan’s offers to turn over bin Laden. The Justice Department was not convinced there was sufficient legal evidence to convict bin Laden. With the perfect clarity and wisdom of retrospection, this and other opportunities were lost.

With this prescient history, Clarke could legitimately assume the mantle of a prophet in the wilderness. The experience, judgments, and credibility he could have brought to the 9/11 Commission have now been squandered with his book Against All Enemies. There are real systemic issues about intelligence gathering and fighting terrorism that will now be lost in partisan battling. Before Clarke’s book and excluding some silly speculation by presidential candidate Howard Dean, there was little partisan effort to blame any particular Administration for September 11, 2001.

The few critiques of the Clinton Administration are at best second guessing, while the Bush Administration simply had too little time to come to grips with the situation. In his testimony before 9/11, Clarke even conceded as much. Clarke was specifically asked, “Assuming that the recommendations that you made on January 25th of 2001 which had been an agenda item at this point for two and a half years without any action, assuming that there had been more Predator reconnaissance missions, assuming that that had all been adopted say on January 26th, year 2001, is there the remotest chance that it would have prevented 9/11?” Clarke answered “No.”

It is now clear that the best way to stop Al Qaeda would have been to launch a pre-emptive strike against Al Qaeda and the Taliban years before September 11, 2001. It is more than ironic that many who now criticize Bush’s action in Iraq and the pre-emption doctrine in general seem to be suggesting that the US should have launched a pre-emptive strike. If Bush had launched such an attack against Al Qaeda and 9/11 had still happened (which is likely given that the attack had been two years in planning), the second-guessers who infest Washington like locusts would have blamed 9/11 on the pre-emptive action.

It is unprecedented for a national security official to write a critical book about an Administration that he served in while that Administration is still in office. National security is not supposed to be a partisan issue. Indeed, although Clarke had a high level position in the Clinton Administration, he was retained by the Bush Administration in the hopes of maintaining national security continuity. After the new precedent of Clarke’s book, if there is a Kerry Administration, it will likely sweep all former national security personnel away, sacrificing continuity for fear that a Bush partisan may use his or her access to later undercut Kerry Administration foreign policy. After Clarke’s book, we are now arguing about who to blame for September 11, when we should reserve anger for Al Qaeda. Too much energy is being wasted pointing fingers at each other.

The two most contentious arguments by Clarke are: (1) The Clinton Administration had no higher priority than anti-terrorism, while the Bush Administration did not appreciate the urgency of the threat. (2) The Bush Administration was too preoccupied with Iraq to the detriment of the fight against Al Qaeda. Clarke argues there was no relationship between Iraq and Al Qaeda.

The first argument is so obviously untrue to even the most casual political observer that it must be disingenuous. Depending on your view of the Clinton Administration, the last months were preoccupied with either mediating negotiation between the Israelis and the Palestinians or arranging for pardons of political contributors. Anti-terrorism may have been important, even very important, but it certainly was not the highest priority of the Clinton Administration. Indeed, Clarke himself, in an incredible intellectual somersault illustrated that higher priorities did exist for the Clinton Administration. He explained in a Frontline interview that a specific response to the attack on the USS Cole that killed 17 American sailors was withheld for fear of derailing the Middle East peace process. Perhaps that was a wise decision at the time, but the fight against Al Qaeda was clearly not the highest priority as Clarke recently claimed.

In a 2002 press briefing, Clarke outlined how the Bush Administration was not content just to maintain the Clinton Administration policy of merely keeping Al Qaeda at bay, but it was willing to go aggressively after Al Qaeda. This implies that anti-terrorism was a higher priority in the Bush Administration. If Clarke’s previous testimony to Congress is declassified, we may learn for certain, that apparently, Clarke made similar positive representations about the Bush Administration under oath.

When questioned about the apparent contradictions by the 9/11 Commission, Clarke, in essence, said he was spinning to give a positive impression of Bush Administration policies in 2002. Clarke hints that to do otherwise would have jeopardized his position. What a self-damning statement. If one is willing to mislead to preserve one’s job, is the one also willing to publicly mislead to sell a book? Once Clarke admits to selling out the truth for personal aggrandizement, he devastates his own credibility.

In his 60 Minutes interview Clarke claimed there was never any connection between Al Qaeda and Iraq and criticized Bush for inquiring about such a relationship. Despite Clarke’s claim, and he should know better, there have been a number of connections, including a visit between bin Laden’s chief deputy in the Sudan to Iraq in1998. A chief suspect, Abdul Rahman Yasin in the 1993 World Trade Center bombings fled to Iraq. According to the Washington Post, Clarke himself made the association between Iraq and Al Qaeda as partial justification for the attacks on the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in August 1998. The attack was a response to the bombings of US embassys in Africa by Al Qaeda.

It is not possible to look into another person’s soul, but Clarke’s own words are now at odds with the recent assertions in his book. Even when they are not contradictory they seem rancorous, bitter, and petty. Why else would Clarke suggest that someone as smart and experienced as National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice did not know about Al Qaeda until he told her? This latter assertion has since been disproved by pre-Bush Administration interviews with Rice.

Is Clarke just pushing a book to make money? Does he have partisan aspirations? Is he just angry at not having received a higher level position in the Bush Administration? Does he believe that Rice did not accord him sufficient respect? Did he take offense that CIA Director George Tenet rather than he provided the President Bush’s daily threat briefing. Perhaps Clarke is just a powerful mind that has gotten confused like a ship with billowing sails and no rudder. Whatever his current motivations, the public record of pre-2003 Clarke is irrefutably at war with the current Clarke. The collateral damage of this war has been to politicize the 9/11 Commission, to introduce unnecessary partisan rancor over a national security issue, and to insure there will be less national security continuity between Administrations of different political parties. Shame on Clarke.

In the immediate wake of the bombings in Madrid now attributed to Al Qaeda that killed over 200, Socialists won an election that days before the massacre, conventional wisdom believed the more conservative party of Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar would win by a safe margin. The public did not support Aznar’s modest contribution of troops to the Coalition that is now stabilizing Iraq, but given the totality of issues, they were set on returning Aznar’s party to power. Now apologists for the Spaniards suggest that the last minute electoral reversal was not appeasement to the killers of 200 Spaniards, rather it was a show of anger and frustration over the fact that the ruling party had at first attributed the explosion to the native Basque Separatists.

There may be some merit to that argument, but that is certainly not what the Spaniards and the Socialists, in particular, are saying. The New York Times made a point of highlighting the quote from a Spaniard, who lamented “Maybe the Socialists will get our troops out of Iraq and Al Qaeda will forget about Spain so we will be less frightened.” Yes, and maybe the Nazis will be satisfied with the Sudetenland.

Let us stand back for a moment. An evil (Why are people so reluctant to use such an obviously apt description?) group decides that to advance its political agenda (Which is to impose a global Islamic theocracy?) it will deliberately kill innocent civilians. The response of the Spanish people is to grant the Islamofascists the political victory they crave. A dangerous precedent is set: kill a large number of random civilians and you can change elections. Will this make groups like Al Qaeda more or less likely to plan similar actions against countries that are ambivalent about the War on Terror? Will the Basque terrorists that have plagued Spain for so long be persuaded that force is a fruitless strategy? British Prime Minister Tony Blair is under political pressure. Is it not more likely that terrorist groups will now try to influence British elections by killing British citizens?

The new Socialist Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero calls the situation is Iraq a “fiasco.” Current Iraqi problems are not the fault of the majority of the Iraqi people who want to move to a democratic government. They are not the fault of the Coalition forces that are trying to provide security and are helping Iraqis build a free and prosperous Iraq. Before the war, Iraq was slowly collapsing with negative growth rates, Iraq had enormous economic growth in the last year and in 2004, it expected to achieve experience 19% growth. All of this while schools and hospitals have been rehabilitated and opened. Before the war, thousands were killed by the oppressive Iraqi regime who skimmed enough money from the Oil-for-Food program to insure the death of thousands of children from malnutrition. Now the Iraqis have a provisional legal structure that protects individual liberties.

The remaining problems in Iraq are primarily the consequence of a minority of Baathist Party remnants angry at their loss of totalitarian control and Al Qaeda bent on nipping an incipient Arab democracy in the bud. The Spanish have just granted such forces a symbolic victory. If everyone followed the Spanish example and pulled out of Iraq without completing the necessary economic and political development, it would invite untold hardship and oppression of the Iraqi people by the same movement that killed 200 Spaniards.

The new foreign minister of Spain Miguel Moratinos has sagely intoned, “We think we have to use very complex and different instruments to counter terrorism, rather than simply force.” This statement is so deliberately and willfully untruthful that it is not even wrong. Certainly, force has not been the only response. A large fraction of the effort in Iraq, a noble effort that the Spanish may be withdrawing from, is to build a functional and free society in Iraq that will help stand as a bulwark against terrorism. Moreover, Moratinos’s statement illustrates a systemic confusion about terrorism. The cause of terrorism is not poverty or ignorance any more than Nazism was justified by the German post World War I experience. There are many who are poor or disenfranchised who will not target civilian populations with bombings calculated to maximize deaths. Islamic-radicalism like Nazism is an evil ideology based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature and rights of man.

Hundreds of Spaniards are killed, millions in Iraq need help, and Spain cowers behind its borders congratulating itself on its fine-tuned moral sensitivities. Others will remember the admonishment of Dante, that “the hottest places in hell are reserved for those, who in time of great moral crisis maintain their neutrality.”

Former Democratic contender Governor Howard Dean can testify to the notion that endorsements are not always as desirable as they appear. When Vice-President Al Gore endorsed Dean on December 9, 2003, he passed along to Dean not only an endorsement, but the famous Gore luck and impeccable sense of timing. Less than a week later, the United States armed forces captured former Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein and punctured the balloon of Dean’s previously ascending anti-war campaign. The event was a symbolic turning point for Dean.

Nonetheless, politicians instinctively seek out endorsements like moths to a flame. Sometimes, they even boast of them when the endorsers are too shy to make their endorsements public. On March 8 of this year, the sure-to-be Democratic presidential nominee, Senator John Kerry bragged that, “I’ve met with foreign leaders who can’t go out and say this publicly. But, boy they look at you and say: `You’ve got to win this. You have got to beat this guy. We need a new policy.’ Things like that.” Of course, the way the boast is framed, it is impossible to refute. There have been some public denials by foreign governments, but these could be proforma so as not to spoil relations with the Bush Administration.

The Washington Times tried to infer which foreign leaders Kerry might have met and from whom Kerry might have received an endorsement by looking at State Department and other public records. The only time when Kerry and a foreign leader were in the same city at the same time since Kerry became a presidential candidate was when the New Zealand Foreign Minister Philip Goff was at the State Department in Washington. There is no record of a Kerry-Goff meeting.

But it is too demanding to hold politicians to exact literal interpretations of their remarks. They often engage in self-aggrandizing exaggerations and short-hand ways of making a point, particularly when speaking extemporaneously. It would not be difficult to infer that there are some foreign leaders who prefer Kerry to President Bush. Surely, French President Jacques Chirac would, and despite German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s public denial of a Kerry endorsement, Schroeder’s preferences are obvious from his previous positions. On the other hand, Tony Blair’s political fortunes are tied to Bush so in his heart-of-hearts, Blair would probably prefer a Bush victory. Certainly, current free Iraqi leaders would prefer Bush. They are probably more convinced of a Bush commitment to Iraq’s long term stability than any Kerry commitment based on Kerry’s vote against authorizing $87 billion to support US troops and Iraqi reconstruction.

Since Kerry has brought up the issue of endorsements by foreign leaders, it seems fair to explore them. Although the opinions of allies are, in general, valuable, they are by no means dispositive. It has been said that nations have no permanent allies, only permanent interests. Hence, endorsement by foreign powers of American political candidates is a double edged sword.

Can we extend our analysis of approval by allies to disapproval of candidates by foreign enemies? David Broeder of the Washington Post did a little research and found that Democratic Senator Samuel Jackson of Indiana, who chaired the 1944 Democratic National Convention, had no problem using the wishes of our enemies as a political stick with which to pound Republicans over the head. Jackson said of a Republican victory, “How many battleships would a Democratic defeat be worth to Tojo? How many Nazi legions would it be worth to Hitler? … We must not let the American ballot box to be made Hitler’s secret weapon.”

Given his current predicament, it is a safe bet that Saddam Hussein would have preferred that Bush were not president last year. European papers report that North Korean dictator Kim Jong-il expressed a preference for Kerry.

Let us affirm absolutely, that Kerry is no friend to our enemies and would embrace the capture of Osma bin Laden or the containment of Korea’s nuclear program with as much relish as anyone in the current Administration. However, he presumably has a different approach for the War on Terror and foreign policy. If Kerry boasts of foreign endorsements, is it fair to ask the question, who would Osma bin Laden prefer to win? Andres Mckenna Polling and Research asked a sample of 800 registered voters who would “the terrorists prefer.” By a substantial margin, 60 to 25 percent, voters assumed that terrorist would prefer Kerry. Perhaps both the public and the terrorists are wrong and Kerry would prove to more formidable than Bush, but are we allowed to ask the question? Would Bush or Kerry be more adept at executing the War on Terror?